opinions on mark clark?

[zukkov]

now that we've got cmak on the horizon, i'm wondering what the forum's view of general clark is. i really don't know a great deal about the italian campaign, but from what i've seen on the history channel, i'm not impressed with the man. at least not his ability as a commander. i'd be interested in what y'all have to say....

ps. there was a line in the movie patton in which a reporter stated that he(patton) was slated to take over for clark in italy, but that was nixxed when patton slapped the private. is that true? and what if patton had taken over? would he have done better?

[Steppe Butcher]

Clark will be remembered in one of two ways,depending on which of two schools of thought you subscribe to:-
1 -He brilliantly recognised that his capture of Rome (rather than cutting off large German forces elsewhere) would give a tremendous morale-boosting shot in the arm to the troops about to invade Normandy on D-Day.
2 -By taking Rome instead of cutting them off meant they were let off the hook to reposition.
Historians will continue debating it for evermore.Certainly the taking of Rome would have electrified the D-Day troops:-"Romes fallen! Clarks got Rome!" and that news would undoubtedly have been in the forefront of their minds as they stormed ashore in Normandy.
Incidentally,Clark had the "ROMA" city-limits roadsign shipped back to the States after the war and set up in his garden!

[ July 30, 2003, 03:17 PM: Message edited by: Steppe Butcher ]

[wbs]

From Steppe Butcher:

Incidentally,Clark had the "ROMA" city-limits roadsign shipped back to the States after the war and set up in his garden! Well, I guess he was entitled to do that smile.gif

[zukkov]

damn, i had forgotten that i started this thread! i must say, i did expect more responses at the time. seems not too many folks really gives a rat about the italian front. anyway, my own take on clark is mostly negative. he sent his forces in peacemeal to be slaughtered. and kept doing it. he failed to capitalize on his "end run" at anzio. i believe patton or bradly would have done much better....

[Ex Bellator]

Clark disobeyed an explicit order to cut off the retreating German forces from the Gustav Line which may well have wrapped up the Italian theater in June 44. Unfortunately no-one is able to check with the thousands of young men who died because of this whether the thought of him 'electrifying' minds before D-Day was worth it. I suspect that the minds of men going into D-Day were 'electrified' enough already.

Let's also not forget his instruction to Lucas at Anzio beach 'not to stick his neck out' again contrary to Alexander who wanted Lucas to push on with all speed. He thereby condemned the men on the beachead to waiting until it was virtually impossible to move out.

Also Walker's Texan Division suffered terribly in a hopeless attack dreamt up by Clarke as a diversion.

To me he seemed obsessed by his own ego, many Allied Generals were, but few killed so many men because of it.

BTW I thought I'd given this forum up, damn, I must try harder...

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Rex Bellator:
Let's also not forget his instruction to Lucas at Anzio beach 'not to stick his neck out' again contrary to Alexander who wanted Lucas to push on with all speed. He thereby condemned the men on the beachead to waiting until it was virtually impossible to move out.

The decision by Lucas not to advance turned out to be a huge blessing in disguise. Had he pushed on, his force would have been chopped to pieces. Think of what happened to the Rangers at Cisterna only 10 times worse.

[Ex Bellator]

That's a possibility Kingfish, but I can only recount the certanty that he waited until he had 75,000 men on the beach before attempting a major inland push, by which time the defenders had increased from virtually nothing to 90,000. That 'strategy' doesn't make sense to me, at minimum pegging out a deeper beachead would have been more advisable? Anyway for me the big issue is his disobeying of orders to seize Rome for his personal 'glory' and condemning thousands more men to die.

As an aside I have a letter 'signed' by Mark Clark expressing condolences on the death of my Uncle in Korea. As you can tell I'm not sure at all that he was the writer, especially as my Uncle was a British tank commander, but it's a nice touch which I hope helped my family back then. So although I don't like him at all from what I've read, perhaps he did have some redeeming features.

[Aacooper]

I believe that Clark was an average general. He had pretty good fundamentals, but he probably wasn't as good as he thought he was.

His most controversial decision was during the 1944 breakout, as Mr. Butcher stated. "Command Decisions" gives it a different take. If Clark hooked right he would have more directly encircled the Germans, but he felt (and maybe Rome clouded his thinking) in the broken-up terrain he wouldn't be able to seal the Germans off. Instead, if he out-raced the Germans north he thought he could collect a larger bag of prisoners. I'm sympathetic to his dilemma -- look at how many Germans escaped the Falaise bag.

In Anzio, I believe he was more or less opposed to the idea, or thought it needed more troops.

Of course, like every general not named Juin he got the answer wrong at Monte Cassino.

On the bright side, he did well piercing the German line at Altuzzo.

All in all, he wasn't the best, and he wasn't the worst. All Allied generals in the Italian campaign were hampered by the terrain, weather, and secondary front status of the theatre.

[Michael Emrys]

Clark was one of the Army's fair-haired boys and rising stars before the war. He was regarded as brilliant and great things were expected of him. That's why he was appointed Eisenhower's deputy for Torch.

But his actual performance in command soured a lot of people on him. I will not lay a claim to know the truth of the matter, but it does seem that the consensus of opinion is that his move to grab Rome against orders was motivated more by a hunger for personal glory and to advance his career than any other factor.

I wonder if his talents would not have been better suited to a bureaucratic job in the Pentagon on Marshall's staff.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Rex Bellator:
... That 'strategy' doesn't make sense to me, at minimum pegging out a deeper beachead would have been more advisable? ...Sure, it appears to be more advisable, but consider this: every mile further inland increased the length of the beachhead perimeter by something like 7 or 8 miles. Considering the forces that were avalable were already somewhat stretched, that extra length would have been ... troublesome in the least.

Lots of mistakes were made at Anzio after the landing, but the biggest one occurred months before and on a different continent. Adm King's blantant shafting of the European war in favour of the one in the Pacific meant that there would never be enough LCTs available to make Op SHINGLE (Anzio) large enough to be decisive. It also meant that there weren't really enough LCAs even for Op OVERLORD.

BTW, I think Clark was a prima-donna who shouldn't have been allowed a command again after his antics in North Africa. His decision at Rome was particularly reprehensible - would the first troops ashore on D-Day even have heard the news? Even if they had, it's a pretty weak justification - I think an Allied Army Group thrusting into Southern Germany late in '44 would have overall done more for their morale.

Someone must have liked him though, since he ended up running the show in Italy.

Regards
JonS

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Rex Bellator:
... That 'strategy' doesn't make sense to me, at minimum pegging out a deeper beachead would have been more advisable? ...Sure, it appears to be more advisable, but consider this: every mile further inland increased the length of the beachhead perimeter by something like 7 or 8 miles.</font>[/QUOTE]Actually only about 3 miles. But more importantly, it would have put the perimeter on more defensible terrain and have denied the Germans overlooking positions from which they could call down observed artillery fire over the whole lodgement, including the beaches where supplies were necessarily unloaded. Eventually the Allies had to fight their way up into those hills at great cost.

Michael

[russellmz]

Originally posted by JonS:
His decision at Rome was particularly reprehensible - would the first troops ashore on D-Day even have heard the news? Even if they had, it's a pretty weak justification - I think an Allied Army Group thrusting into Southern Germany late in '44 would have overall done more for their morale.
i remember reading about one guy at normandy bragging to his german prisoners that allied troops were just outside rome, and the germans were surprised, saying they heard on the radio that it had already fallen.

[HeinzBaby]

Clark? very 'pedestrian' [3. prosaic; dull] Collins Australian Pocket English dictionary. IIRC Rome was an 'Open' City.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:
The decision by Lucas not to advance turned out to be a huge blessing in disguise. Had he pushed on, his force would have been chopped to pieces. Think of what happened to the Rangers at Cisterna only 10 times worse. Ahem - when Lucas decided to hang around on the beach a bit longer (and the beaches there are very nice, so who can blame him), there was scarcely a German unit between him and Rome. A sharp advance with combined arms forward detachments would, in the opinion of German observers, have cooked the goose of 10th Army in the Cassino position (see e.g.'Anzio - Eine Schlacht der Fuehrungsfehler' or John Ellis' 'Cassino'), and they were flabbergasted (but very happy) that this was not done. By day three (but not before) they knew they had the Allies were they wanted them - bottled up in the bridgehead. The Rangers at Cisterna are absolutely not a valid comparison, because by the time that particular clusterf*ck happened, the Germans had brought up a whole new army to lock down and destroy the bridgehead, and the Rangers happened to run into them during a breakout attempt.

At the time of the invasion, the Germans had a grand total of 2 batteries (one 10cm one 17cm) able to fire at the bridgehead, and the only forces available were the Reconnaissance Abteilung of 29. PGD (?), one company of which had been caught in their beds in Nettuno, according to the German history.

Fortunately enough for the Allies, the German commander on the ground later on in the battle (von Mackensen) was giving Clark a run for his money in the ineptness compartment, and OKW interfered heavily in the counter-attack planning.

As for Clark in general - read John Ellis' 'Cassino', he is extremely critical of the man. He is harsh on all involved, except Juin and the French Expeditionary Corps, but particularly harsh on Clark and the staffers in the British Corps who planned the move up the Liri Valley.

[Kingfish]

Ahem - when Lucas decided to hang around on the beach a bit longer (and the beaches there are very nice, so who can blame him), there was scarcely a German unit between him and Rome.True, but we have the luxury of 20/20 hindsight. While the Allied high command anticipated (correctly) that the landings would catch the Germans by surprise, they also anticipated that the Germans would react swiftly to the threat in their rear. Unfortunately, the ability of the Allies to bring in sufficient reinforcements were hampered by the lack of adequate shipping (see JonS's post). They were able to land two reinforced divisions in the first wave, sufficient to hold the beachhead, but it would take another 3 days before the next batch of reinforcements were to arrive. By then the Germans had elements of 8 divisions deployed around Anzio, with more to come.

A sharp advance with combined arms forward detachments would, in the opinion of German observers, have cooked the goose of 10th Army in the Cassino position Combined arms forward detachements as in Battalion size? Brigade size? From where would these detachements come from? What would be their objectives, and who would guard the beachhead and the LOCs? Keep in mind that with each mile of advance, 7 miles is added to the perimeter. IMO, to 'cook the goose' of the 10th army the VI corp needed to interdict not only route 7, but route 6 as well. That is an avance of +20 miles beyond the beaches, too far for the initial landing force.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:
Keep in mind that with each mile of advance, 7 miles is added to the perimeter.I've already challenged a statement like this. Would you please be so kind as to explain by what mathematical means you derive this notion?

Michael

[Andreas]

Well, that is a different argument from saying 'look at the poor rangers at Cisterna'. If the same argument had been brought up against Cobra, for example, that operation would have had to be postponed as well, because really there were still too many German Panzer divisions around, and only with 20/20 hindsight do we know that they are not strong enough to win at Mortain.

What this argument overlooks is the effect that speed and a daring advance would have had in the rear areas. You don't need a lot of forces to create total havoc in the German rear. The German HQ for Italy was located in frascati, a few hours drive from the beachhead, and the allies knew that. Threatening it would have ruptured the C&C chain of the Germans in the theatre while it PUFOs. Just an example. If the allies had pushed these FDs forward far enough, the Germans would not have been able to concentrate the forces as quickly against them. Remember that the 7 mile increase applies to the Germans as well, forcing them to spread their forces thinner - and while there were elements of 8 divisions in place within a few days, these were overall still weak.

In the end, Lucas acted under Clark's instruction (ignoring Alexander's) at Anzio, namely to play it safe, instead of exploiting a very favourable situation. He was later made the fall-guy for that. A competent general of the risk-taking ilk, such as von Manstein, Rommel, Guderian, Patton, maybe Slim, or Juin, would probably have gone hell-for-leather to get out of the bridgehead and just disrupt the German rear-areas. One should not forget that Lucas' strategy, with 20/20 hindsight, does not look very impressive as a risk-reduction strategy, if you look at the situation in the German counter-offensive of February. It certainly was not risk-free, it just traded risk now for risk later.

[Kingfish]

I've already challenged a statement like this. Would you please be so kind as to explain by what mathematical means you derive this notion?Sure, here is the formula:
"f(x) = ax2 + bx + c" or "y = ax2 + bx + c."

Seriously, I did not rely on any mathimatical means, but instead relied on my own fuzzy and slowly diminishing memory. IOW, I read that somewhere. I could be wrong.

Just curious, how did you get the 1 mile advance = 3 miles of perimeter?

[Dook]

Guys, I'm no mathematician, but it seems to me that some additional information is needed to get definitive answers to your questions regarding how much the perimeter increased for each mile of advance. The most obvious bits of info lacking is the width of the beachhead and the width of the advance.

If you assume the beachhead is 1 mile wide (picked for mathematical convenience) and the initial advance is straight inland from the center of the beachhead, you could think of the perimeter as a triangle with a base of 1 mile and a height of 1 mile. The length of one side of the triange would be the square roote of two (1.414). The perimeter, not including the beach behind you, would be 2 x 1.414 = 2.828, or pretty close to three.

Things get a lot more complicated after that depending on the width of the frontage and the evenness of advance.

[Kingfish]

Well, that is a different argument from saying 'look at the poor rangers at Cisterna'. If the same argument had been brought up against Cobra, for example, that operation would have had to be postponed as well, because really there were still too many German Panzer divisions around, and only with 20/20 hindsight do we know that they are not strong enough to win at Mortain.

But one big difference between Cobra and Shingle was that Cobra was launched with sufficient forces to achieve the objectives. Not so for Shingle. Again, a force of 2 reinforced divisions is sufficient to hold the beachhead, but not to exploit beyond it in strength. Just MHO.

What this argument overlooks is the effect that speed and a daring advance would have had in the rear areas. You don't need a lot of forces to create total havoc in the German rear. The German HQ for Italy was located in frascati, a few hours drive from the beachhead, and the allies knew that. Threatening it would have ruptured the C&C chain of the Germans in the theatre while it PUFOs. Just an example. If the allies had pushed these FDs forward far enough, the Germans would not have been able to concentrate the forces as quickly against them. Remember that the 7 mile increase applies to the Germans as well, forcing them to spread their forces thinner - and while there were elements of 8 divisions in place within a few days, these were overall still weak.

I have no doubt that several FDs running around in the rear area would have caused some panic in the German high command, but here's the $64,000 question: would that be enough to force the Germans to quit the Gustav line? IMO, I don't think so. At least not without a strong response by the Germans to try and restore the situation, and that response would have been too much for a couple of FDs to withstand by themselves.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:
But one big difference between Cobra and Shingle was that Cobra was launched with sufficient forces to achieve the objectives. Not so for Shingle. Again, a force of 2 reinforced divisions is sufficient to hold the beachhead, but not to exploit beyond it in strength. Just MHO.Well, that to me is the difference between our thinking. I am quite sure that Patton's forces at Cobra were not sufficient to liberate the whole of Brittany, and attempt the southern pincer move on Falaise while simultaneously establishing a Seine bridgehead, and threaten Paris. But all of this they did, sometimes at great risk (the Seine bridgehead, Mortain). Speaking in Matrix terms - if they had freed their mind, they would have seen that there is no beach-head. Not if they do it right. Just look at what the Red Army did in Poland in 1945, during the Vistula-Oder operation (best source is probably Duffy 'Red Storm on the Reich'), or earlier during the raid by 25th Tank Corps on Tatsinskaya in 1942 (although I assume you would see that as a failure?).

IMO it is a lack of imagination on the part of Clark and Lucas. You should not forget that the Germans also had no idea that there were only two reinforced divisions present, at the outset. As far as they knew it could have been a lot more - they only got this information later. Rapid, decisive action was what was called for, and the commanders failed to deliver it. If Clark had gotten round to the idea that he only wanted a bridgehead by this time, and not an attempt to destroy the Cassino position, he should have called off the whole venture, because then it was a total waste of resources.

I am still wondering who should have interfered with the forward detachments, BTW? There was nobody there, and just in case you are not aware, it is an hour by slow train from Roma Termini to Nettuno. Or 51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio, according to viamichelin.com - none of that on the motorway. So if the Germans could have had some force there in 3 days to crush the over-extended reinforced 2 divisions is neither here nor there, seeing that at the time of the landing nobody was there. The allies could have organised rotating sightseeing trips to the forum for all the soldiers in the meantime. :D

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Andreas:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kingfish:
[qb] I am still wondering who should have interfered with the forward detachments, BTW? There was nobody there, and just in case you are not aware, it is an hour by slow train from Roma Termini to Nettuno. Or 51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio, according to viamichelin.com - none of that on the motorway. So if the Germans could have had some force there in 3 days to crush the over-extended reinforced 2 divisions is neither here nor there, seeing that at the time of the landing nobody was there. The allies could have organised rotating sightseeing trips to the forum for all the soldiers in the meantime. :D Accounts I read show elements of the 4th Fallschrimjager and Herman Goering Panzer division in reserve around Rome. I know that there were a few skirmishes between the HG and U.S. 3rd infantry around the Mussolini canal during the first two days.

Granted, it falls short of a Panzer Corp, but it's something. Just like it doesn't take a lot of force to create total havoc in the German rear, likewise it doesn't take a lot of force to block or delay an Allied advance beyond the beachhead. Once you are past Route 7 you are into the Alban hills, and that rugged terrain favors the defense.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:
Once you are past Route 7 you are into the Alban hills, and that rugged terrain favors the defense. But that would certainly work both ways, wouldn't it? Once the Allied forces are in them hills, they would have a much easier time defending than in the plain in front of Anzio/Nettuno. Especially since that would have taken out a lot of the OPs from which the Germans had a good view into the beachhead later.

[JonS]

Andreas,
you seem to have fallen into the thrall of the maneauverists - 'If we can just be running around in their rear areas we will disrupt their HQs and supply lines and they'll, why they'll just give up! Or sumfink.'

I thought you were better than that?

Regards
JonS

[ July 31, 2003, 04:58 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:
Andreas,
you seem to have fallen into the thrall of the maneauverists - 'I we can just be running around in their rear areas we will disrupt their HQs and supply lines and they'll, why they'll just give up! Or sumfink.'

I thought you were better than that?

Regards
JonS Ah, but attrition only works if there is something to attrit in the first place. The Soviets in the Vistula-Oder operation did attrition first, maneuver later. Lucas simply could not do attrition during the first days (there was nothing there), so the correct answer in this case is IMO not 'I shall sit on my ass until I can have a battle of attrition by being provided with a credible opposition courtesy of my esteemed opponent' but 'Yee-haa!', to put it into military expert lingo. :D

Unlike some of the people who like to fight about it, I am very naive, and adamantly continue to believe that attrition and maneuver are inextricably linked. One is pointless without the other.

[JonS]

True, and I agree that Lucas could have - and probably should have - advanced further than he did in the first days. However, to say that he had sufficient force in the first wave to do anything more than establish a credible beachhead is, I think, fanciful.

Where the beachhead line should have been established could be a fruitful debate, but talk of Rome, Frascati, Routes 6 & 7, etc, are silly. I think.

BTW, your example of '51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio' is equally silly, as you well know ;)

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:
Keep in mind that with each mile of advance, 7 miles is added to the perimeter.I've already challenged a statement like this. Would you please be so kind as to explain by what mathematical means you derive this notion?</font>[/QUOTE]Michael, the underlying assumption to the 7 or 8 mile figure is that the entire beachhead would be expanded by 1 mile. Your three mile figure seems to assume a 1 mile wide, 1 mile deep finger.

Hmm. I just fiddled about with some numbers, based on the assumption that the perimeter was a perfect half-circle. And indeed, as you said, each extra mile of depth adds 3 miles to the perimeter.

Hmm. Well, I must be mistaken about that then (IIRC, I got the larger figure from Ellis, Cassino). My apologies.

However, the larger point I was trying to make was that gaining more depth for the beachhead added significantly to the perimeter. At an initial depth of two miles (which is about what was established, IIRC), adding a mile of depth also adds 50% to the frontage to be defended.

Regards
JonS

[ July 31, 2003, 05:34 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Robert Isenberg]

I was thinking more of a radius effect
from the landing point you force would radiate out covering all terrain 1 mile from the beach since no major German force would attempt to counter attack from sea(too many ships in the area)so this becomes a pi equation
with a 1 mile inland beach head producing a 3.14 mile perimeter,2 miles in a 6.28 mile perimeter and so forth
Of course this assumes the beach head is a straight line and you are able form your perimeter with no bulges or alcoves

Originally posted by Dook:
Guys, I'm no mathematician, but it seems to me that some additional information is needed to get definitive answers to your questions regarding how much the perimeter increased for each mile of advance. The most obvious bits of info lacking is the width of the beachhead and the width of the advance.

If you assume the beachhead is 1 mile wide (picked for mathematical convenience) and the initial advance is straight inland from the center of the beachhead, you could think of the perimeter as a triangle with a base of 1 mile and a height of 1 mile. The length of one side of the triange would be the square roote of two (1.414). The perimeter, not including the beach behind you, would be 2 x 1.414 = 2.828, or pretty close to three.

Things get a lot more complicated after that depending on the width of the frontage and the evenness of advance.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:
BTW, your example of '51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio' is equally silly, as you well know ;) Just an attempt to make sure everybody is clear about the distances involved. I was very surprised when I actually took the train to Anzio for the first time (my girlfriend's mother has a villa in Nettuno, and she lives in Rome), that it really is no distance at all.

Regarding the forces in the area, on Monday I get back to my sources (Ellis and this German write-up, the latter is quite detailed), and post them here.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:
Just curious, how did you get the 1 mile advance = 3 miles of perimeter? Simple rule of thumb. The perimeter at Anzio was roughly (alright, very roughly) semicircular. So the formula for finding the perimeter of a circle, suitably modified, would apply. The perimeter of a circle is found by multiplying the diameter by pi. Thus, the length of the arc of a semicircle (which is what we are talking about here) can be found by multiplying the radius (half of the diameter) by pi. So, if the radius of the perimeter was 1 mile, the defended perimeter would be 3 miles (imprecise, but close enough for our purposes I trust). If you expand the front outward by one mile all around to 2 miles, the defended perimeter becomes 6 miles. And so forth. Feel free to draw yourself a diagram if it will help and measure it all off.

smile.gif

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dook:
Guys, I'm no mathematician, but it seems to me that some additional information is needed to get definitive answers to your questions regarding how much the perimeter increased for each mile of advance. The most obvious bits of info lacking is the width of the beachhead and the width of the advance.

If you assume the beachhead is 1 mile wide (picked for mathematical convenience) and the initial advance is straight inland from the center of the beachhead, you could think of the perimeter as a triangle with a base of 1 mile and a height of 1 mile. The length of one side of the triange would be the square roote of two (1.414). The perimeter, not including the beach behind you, would be 2 x 1.414 = 2.828, or pretty close to three.

Things get a lot more complicated after that depending on the width of the frontage and the evenness of advance. I think this gives an even better approximation of the actual case than my answer, which assumed that the perimeter was expanded evenly in all directions, which wasn't historically true.

BTW, it can be mathematically demonstrated that the increase of perimeter can in no case be less than 2 miles for every mile advanced. Proof left to the student.

;)

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:
Hmm. Well, I must be mistaken about that then (IIRC, I got the larger figure from Ellis, Cassino). My apologies.No apology required, but I wonder how Ellis arrived at his figure.

:confused:

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.

A few thoughts spring to mind

Hard to set up any defence in depth with a restricted area.

I assume that the naval forces present had no trouble shooting beyond the perimeter and then the air power to interdict moving columns reacting to a foray into the rear of the Germans.

Reliable information from the Italians available?

It does appear that gaining [some]the overlooking hills at least would have been a smart move.

I am with Andreas and Michael on this one.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:
Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.I recall one of Churchill's gripes was that there were an ungodly number of trucks in the lodgement, especially in light of the fact that they weren't going anywhere.

Michael

[ August 01, 2003, 08:59 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:
Where the beachhead line should have been established could be a fruitful debate, but talk of Rome, Frascati, Routes 6 & 7, etc, are silly. I think. Jon, have a look here (http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/anziobeach/map03.jpg) and here (http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/anziobeach/map04.jpg). These are the official maps from the US history available online at CMH. The first map is dated 22/23 Jan. and shows the weakness of German forces. The second is from 29 Jan, and still shows only weakish forces (note all the battalions are "(-)").

I think it should be clear that occupying the road centres 'Junction NE of Ardea', Campoleone/Osteraccia and Cisterna was not a 'silly' or fanciful proposition, and would at the very least have created serious problems for a defensive perimeter to contain the bridgehead later. Highway 7 was certainly within the reach of the landed forces. Cisterna appears to be about 23km from Nettuno, all on decent roads.

[ August 01, 2003, 12:44 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Kingfish]

A couple of interesting quotes from this site (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-A-Anzio/USA-A-Anzio-1.html)

The assault plan assumed the possibility of initial heavy resistance on the beaches, and the certainty of heavy counterattacks once the enemy was fully aware of the extent of the landing. Consequently, VI Corps held out a strong reserve and placed great emphasis on digging in early at initial objectives to repel armored counterattacks. The bulk of the 1 Division, with the 46 Royal Tank Regiment, the 24 Field Regiment, and the So Medium Regiment attached, was to remain on shipboard as a floating reserve.

Farther down the page it states:

By 24 January the 3d Division had occupied the right sector of the initial beachhead along the Mussolini Canal. The 504th Parachute Infantry held the right flank along the main canal; in the center the 15th Infantry, and on its left the 30th Infantry, faced Cisterna along the west branch. Ranger Force relieved all but the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the division left in the quiet central beachhead sector. Meanwhile the 2 Brigade of the 1 Division, under the command of Brig. E. E. J. Moore, rounded out its sector of the beachhead by advancing to the Moletta River line. The remainder of the division was held in Corps reserve in anticipation of an enemy counterattack. In two days VI Corps had secured a beachhead seven miles deep against only scattered opposition.

Thats a sizeable chunk of the British contingent. No doubt that had an effect on the drive to Campeleone. One thing it does point out, VI Corp anticipated a strong German response within days of the landing, and was focused more on defending than exploiting.

Overly cautious? Maybe, but according to Allied intelligence:

From the latest intelligence available on enemy troops in the Rome area, Army G-2 estimated that VI Corps could expect an initial D Day resistance from one division assigned to coast watching' four parachute battalions from Rome, a tank and an antitank battalion, and miscellaneous coast defense personnel, totaling 14,300 men. By D plus 1, another division, an SS infantry regiment from north of Rome, a regimental combat team from XIV Panzer Corps reserve, and perhaps elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division could arrive. By D plus 2 or 3 the enemy might have appreciated that the Allies had weakened the Eighth Army front; if so, he could bring the 26th Panzer Division from that sector to produce a total build-up of 31,000 men.

[Andreas]

Yep Kingfish, and all that Intel was, well, bollocks. There was no heavy resistance on the beaches, there was no division assigned to defending the area. Now, if the first five minutes of your landing show you that one part of the intel is seriously flawed, would it not be a good idea to test whether the rest of it is correct? Which could have been done by immediate aggressive reconnaissance. Instead what seems to have happened is that the forward detachments were pushed out just as far as was planned under the flawed intel and no further, even when they did not meet any resistance. All this when this intel had been shown to be false already. It was the most conservative option possible - well, short of re-embarking. The point is that a less conservative action would in this situation have been justified by the new intel gathered after the landing - there is next to no-one here.

The approach march of 26th Panzer would have taken days (and actually did), which you need to add to the D*2-3 estimate for actually releasing it from the front. The same goes for a lot of other forces. Also note that the CMH report does not seem to even mention the controversy about Lucas ignoring Alexander's intent, if not orders, and seems designed to just gloss over it.

It does say this though, which I note you forgot to quote, although it follows one of your quotes: If the Fifth Army attack in the south were sufficiently powerful and sustained, it should pin down all enemy reserves in that area. G-2 did not believe that the Germans could bring down reinforcements quickly from northern Italy, especially in the face of overwhelming Allied air superiority. Probable build-up from north of Florence was estimated to be not more than two divisions by D plus 16. The final summary by G-2, Fifth Army, on 16 January pointed out the increasing attrition of enemy troops: Within the last few days there have been increasing indications that enemy strength on the Fifth Army front is ebbing, due to casualties, exhaustion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no doubt, has been the recent, continuous Allied attacks. From this it can be deduced that he has no fresh reserves and very few tired ones. His entire strength will probably be needed to defend his organized defensive positions. (bolded by me).

[Kingfish]

Hehe, why do I get the feeling we are talking about two different things here?

First off, I will agree with you 101% that Lucas should have advanced farther with the first wave. At the very least he should have secured the hills astride route 7, so as to prevent observation of the invasion beaches. Land the remainder of Brit 1st div and push to Campeleone, while the US 3rd goes for Cisterna, all within the first two days. Then hunker down and await the US 45th and 1st armored to continue on to Route 6. So far so good.

What I do not agree with is that Lucas should have pushed as far as Route 6 with the force he had at the time, and that is exactly what Alexander was calling for. I do not believe he was adequetely equipped for such a deep thrust, regardless of whether or not there were any Germans.

This is what I've been arguing all along.

[Andreas]

KINGFISH:
How far? Quick.
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
What?
KINGFISH:
I say he has to take account of the reserves.
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Oh. Uhhh, Highway 7?
KINGFISH:
Right.
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
What?
KINGFISH:
There you are.
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Wait a minute.
KINGFISH:
What?
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Well, we're-- we're supposed to argue.
KINGFISH:
No, no. I agree--
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
What do you mean, 'no, no, no'?
KINGFISH:
I haven't time. I agree--
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Well, say something else, then.
KINGFISH:
No, no, no. I just agree with you.
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Jon!
JON:
Yeah?
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
This bloke won't argue.
JON:
Won't argue?!
KINGFISH:
All right. Do we have to?
ANDREAS THE ARGUER:
Now, look. I say they should have gone for Highway 7.
KINGFISH:
I-- I just agreed with that.

etc. (With apologies to Monty Python)

[JonS]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:
Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.Diesel,
the beachhead overall was quite crowded, but during the critical battles in February there wasn't an excess of combat units, which is really what this debate is about.

Your assumption about airpower and naval gunnery is mostly ok, but it wasn't the complete panacea you seem to think it would have been. The smaller ships (destroyers) couldn't reach out to the perimeter line that was established between Campoleone and Cisterna, and only a few heavier ships were available. Had VI Corps advanced further into the hills, even this support would have been lost.

The closest airfields were back near Naples, approx 100 miles away, which slowed their response time, limited their time on-station, and meant that there was a critical period each dawn and dusk when no air-cover was available. These time periods are when most of the Allied shipping casualties occurred.
Originally posted by Michael Emrys:
I recall one of Churchill's gripes was that there were an ungodly number of trucks in the lodgement, especially in light of the fact that they weren't going anywhere.Michael,
that is just Churchill showing his traditional ignorance of matters logistical.

The supply services for VI Corps set up a shuttle service with three groups of 500 trucks. One group would be in Naples loading stores, the second would be on the LSTs either heading to Anzio with fresh supplies or returning with salvage, and the third would be in the beachhead unloading their stores and getting ready for the return trip. When an LST from Naples landed at Anzio the trucks on board simply drove off to their assign stores dump, and the empty trucks in the beachhead would drive onto the LSTs.

In this way the turn-around time for the LSTs on the beach was reduced to just 1 hour - down from about 24 hours using traditional methods. It was a very inefficient way to use trucks, but a very efficient way to use the LSTs. And guess which was the limiting factor? ;)

The problem was that in March, Churchill was told that 25,000 trucks had been landed at Anzio - each with a two man crew - and did his prunes. What he wasn't told was that of those 25,000, the vast majority were multiple appearances of the same trucks as part of the shuttle service round-a-bout.

BTW, IMHO, one of the sillier aspects of Op SHINGLE was have a force made up of two nationalities (UK & US). From a logistics POV this was senseless, but the decision was taken to do it that way for a number of political reasons.

(FWIW, I wrote a logistics paper on Op SHINGLE last year. If you are interested, email me for a copy)

Andreas,
I've seen the maps, and plenty of others of a similar ilk. It doesn't really matter what we know now - what matters is what Lucas believed at the time.

1) Was Lucas too passive? Probably.
2) Could Lucas have pushed out further in the first couple of days? Against what we now know to have been the opposition - definately. Especially considering there was no contact to speak of from the afternoon of D-Day till about the morning of D+2.
3) Could Lucas have pushed out too far and endangered the security of the beachhead? Definately.
4) Did Lucas' decisions, flawed though they may have been, provide for the security of the beachhead? Yes - despite what the Germans threw at VI Corps, they were never able to eliminate the beachhead.

The debate here seems to be revolving around how much emphasis to give to each of the above factors, paticularly #3. I think he did a fair (not great) job with the forces he had on hand.

Regards
JonS

P.S. I thought we were bagging Clark, not some underling on a hiding to nothing? ;)

[ August 01, 2003, 10:05 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Breakthrough]

Clark was certainly no worse then the other US commanders when confronted with Germans in strong defensive positions (Bradley in Normandy, Patton at Metz). Patton would surely have been wasted however in a secondary theatre where the US Army sent every square peg outfit. Granted, there were some very good square pegs (10th Mtn, 442 RCT). A great opportunity was missed not bagging the German forces south of Rome in June of 44, but a southern offensive by the end of that year was no certainty. The US command was committed to Overlord as the main thrust in to Europe.

[sonar]

Someone was excusing Clark with the reasoning that he was trying to establish a bridgehead,but a bridgehead and a toehold are a world away.
Clark stood with one foot on the sand and one in the sea.I don't profess to know a great deal about the man but he seems to have had no real grasp on the situation and it looks to me that he had no real plan after the initial assault which was virtually uncontested if I remember.Alexander told Lucas to"get on with all speed"kind of thing"Clark's advice to Lucas was and I Paraphrase{I think} "Don't stick your neck out I did and nearly got it bitten off".There was only one man capable for the job and that was Patton.He was the only allied general who had a total grasp on favoured Blitzkreig tactics that the Germans had emloyed.Patton whould have attempted the breakout with whatever he had at hand and if he hadn't slapped those two wounded men around,untold numbers would have been saved.Churchill's remark about the whole Anzio Affair was(Para again sorry}"I thought I had a wildcat on my hands but ended up with a beached whale"As for the whole liberation of ROMA thing ..well who can count the cost in life lost?
The German army after making the Allies pay in blood and suffering for every yard of Italian soil were now finally in a position where they could be swiftly cut off and another of Hitlers armies would fall like the 6th at Stalingrad and the Afrika Korr in The Tunisian desert.How much of a morale boost would that be for the Normandy boys?Yet what does Clark do?He takes the cake..the carboard display one that bakers put in their window displays that is,the glitering hollow prize.So if you haven't guessed already I for one am not a huge fan of the man no.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:
Originally posted by JonS:

Diesel,
the beachhead overall was quite crowded, but during the critical battles in February there wasn't an excess of combat units, which is really what this debate is about.
Leave us not forget the 1st Special Service Force held down a frontage far out of proportion to the size of the unit - This features prominently in 1 SSF histories; let me see if I can find the figure.

D-Day Dodgers by Dancocks says this (emphasis added in case it actually helps with any debate on the length of the perimeter):

...the Force promptly took over one-quarter of Anzio's thirty-mile-long front.....The Force was spread dangerously thin. Its front line was held by an average of only one man per twelve yards.This was at the start of February.

[ August 01, 2003, 11:01 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Leave us not forget the 1st Special Service Force held down a frontage far out of proportion to the size of the unit - This features prominently in 1 SSF histories; let me see if I can find the figure.

D-Day Dodgers by Dancocks says this:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> ...the Force promptly took over one-quarter of Anzio's thirty-mile-long front.....The Force was spread dangerously thin. Its front line was held by an average of only one man per twelve yards.</font>[/QUOTE]Not to dimish their efforts, but Michael, the 1SSF front faced south, when all the places of interest were to the north and east. It was also along the Mussolini Canal. And beyond it was the Pontine Marshes.

That is exactly the kind of place to do 'economy of force' operations. Indeed, the Germans put scarcely anything on their side of the canal for the same reasons.

Regards
JonS

[Michael Dorosh]

The Hermann Goering was not an inconsiderably skilled opponent; I'd say tying them down was not unlike the British in Normandy tying down SS panzers in the same way, on a larger scale.

The HG actually calculated that the 1SSF was an entire division since they knew that their OOB was made up of 3 "regiments" - not knowing the term was used deliberately to fool German intelligence.

Nonetheless, the suggestion was made earlier that it must have been a "crowded bridgehead"; certainly 12 men per yard in at least one sector of the front is evidence that it was not thus all over...

[ August 01, 2003, 11:15 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:
The problem was that in March, Churchill was told that 25,000 trucks had been landed at Anzio - each with a two man crew - and did his prunes. What he wasn't told was that of those 25,000, the vast majority were multiple appearances of the same trucks as part of the shuttle service round-a-bout.Ah! That goes a long way towards explaining the matter. But...one might be excused for thinking that by the time he got around to writing his memoir he would have learned of and corrected his mistake. But then this isn't the first time I've come across Churchill living up to his boast that history would be kind to him because he would write it.

Michael

[Andreas]

I would not give a lot on what Churchill said about operations in the Mediterranean from Italy onwards. It appears to me he checked in his brain at the door whenever he went to a meeting about it. In autumn 1943 he was perfectly happy to waste quite a large force (at least a brigade+ of infantry, the LRDG, a couple of destroyers and a squadron or so of Spitfires) in the ill-advised Dodecanese venture. They might have come in handy at Anzio, or anywhere else for that matter.

Michael, I have to agree with Jon - while HG was a skilled opponent, where SSF was sitting not a lot did happen. The Mussolini channel combined with the Pontine Marches was a very good protection - also, for much of that line most of the ship's artillery could work quite well, even on the smaller units. This is IMO confirmed by the fact that the main fighting went on in the other areas, notably Aprilia 'The factory') and in the general direction from there to Cisterna, east of Padiglione wood. Seems to me that maybe the unit history is out to make things a bit more glorious than they were.

As for dissing Clark - well yes, he gave Lucas that stupid advice, didn't he? smile.gif In best Teflon-management manner, Lucas than had to go.

[Andreas]

BTW - while googling for the Leavenworth Paper on Petsamo-Kirkenes, I found this one on the Rangers at Cisterna. Quite interesting and topical. While on a different site, this appears to be Chapter 4 of a Leavenworth Staff College paper on Ranger missions in WW2.

Rangers at Cisterna (http://www.ranger.org/usara/s3/Ops/papers/chapter4.htm)

Does anyone know if Leavenworth papers are still accessible from outside the US post 9/11? If so, can someone email me the link please?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:
BTW, IMHO, one of the sillier aspects of Op SHINGLE was have a force made up of two nationalities (UK & US). From a logistics POV this was senseless, but the decision was taken to do it that way for a number of political reasons.

(FWIW, I wrote a logistics paper on Op SHINGLE last year. If you are interested, email me for a copy) Jon, I forgot about this one. I am not sure (but you certainly know more about it than I do) this was so silly given that the initial planning was not "and we will get ourselves hemmed in and stay here for four months, not going anywhere.", but rather expected a quicker link-up. IIRC most of the landings of multi-divisional size (with the exception of TORCH and DRAGOON), were combined landings. HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD certainly were. In all of these cases, a quick progression away from the beaches presumably brought bigger benefits of having two forces available, outweighing the problems created initially in the logistics department. The failure to get out of the beachhead at Anzio however did not bring that benefit.

Now, since we are rubbishing Clark, how about his interference in the break-out battles. Was that the cause for the escape of the Germans, or do inepet staffers of the British forces, and German Überingenuity have something more to do with it? ISTR Ellis is very generous in rubbishing everyone involved, except (surprise!) Juin and the CEF. I also seem to remember that there was a third way out through the mountains apart from Highways 6 & 7.

BTW - regarding Ellis, his lofty statements about the inability of Allied airpower to threaten German LOCs (in particular his calculation about the required tonnage of supplies and the capacity of the rail network) do not seem to be confirmed by German sources, who e.g. felt that at Anzio they really did not have enough artillery ammunition to deal with the Allies.

[Ex Bellator]

Another good link - well worth a read. For example:

Shortly after noon, enemy paratroopers supported by armored personnel carriers began marching about a dozen captured Rangers toward the center of the 1st and ad Ranger Battalions' position in an attempt to force an American surrender. Ranger marksmen shot two German guards, but the Germans retaliated by bayoneting two of the prisoners and continued to march the rest forward.

The same sequence was repeated a second time- two Germans were shot and two prisoners were bayoneted. This time, however, more Rangers surrendered. The Germans continued to march their captives, now numbering about eighty, toward the center of the Rangers' position shouting that they would shoot the prisoners if the remaining Rangers did not surrender.

For a third time, the surrounded Americans opened fire, but when several prisoners were accidentally killed along with one or two Germans, a few men "who were evidently new to combat got hysterical and started to leave their positions and surrender." They were ordered not to give up but continued to do so, and the piecemeal surrender continued. Even an attempt by the more determined Rangers "to stop" those who wished to surrender "by shooting them" failed.War is hell.

[Kingfish]

...and in the beleaguered 3 Brigade area the 1 KSLI successfully intercepted a party of Germans escorting 100 British prisoners

Sometimes the good guys win too

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:
[QB]
Michael, I have to agree with Jon -Did I say anywhere that I disagreed with him?

where SSF was sitting not a lot did happen. Did I say it did?

The Mussolini channel combined with the Pontine Marches was a very good protection - also, for much of that line most of the ship's artillery could work quite well, even on the smaller units. Did I say otherwise?

This is IMO confirmed by the fact that the main fighting went on in the other areas, notably Aprilia 'The factory') and in the general direction from there to Cisterna, east of Padiglione wood. Did I deny this?

Seems to me that maybe the unit history is out to make things a bit more glorious than they were. Have you read it?

Have I quoted it?

Have I inferred any such thing?

Or did I simply post a quote regarding to the length of the front line at Anzio in addition to the general "crowded" condition of the SSF sector?

What were we on about again? :confused:

[ August 02, 2003, 08:52 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Andreas]

Ah, my apologies, the 'more glorious' bit was actually in reference to the quote from 'D-Day Dodgers' saying the frontline was held 'dangerously thin', not the divisional history. Or sumfink. Other than that it is nice to see we agree.

Although I am not quite sure whether 1st SSF actually tied down much of HG - referring to your second post now. I can check that when I am back with my sources. The Germans did not like to operate with significant forces at the sea-edge of the perimeter, because they were afraid of the naval artillery coming into play there, and I am not sure whether they posted much along the Mussolini Canal.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Although I am not quite sure whether 1st SSF actually tied down much of HG - referring to your second post now. I'm willing to stipulate to that.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Although I am not quite sure whether 1st SSF actually tied down much of HGThis map might help a bit:


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/anziobeach/map19.jpg

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:
Although I am not quite sure whether 1st SSF actually tied down much of HG - referring to your second post now. I'm willing to stipulate to that. </font>[/QUOTE]Que? No idea what you mean by that.

Looking at the map posted by Keke (thanks for that), it looks as if 1st SSF tied down a training para battalion, and a BN size (judging by the boundary line) armour force by HG - my guess would be their recce detachment.

Importantly, the armoured regiment of HG is shown in the second wave of the German attack on the beachhead near Cisterna, so it definitely was not tied down.

[Michael Dorosh]

Stipulate. Attest to. Agree. Not argue. y'know?

[Aacooper]

Somehow the discussion about Clark turned into an Anzio thread. If I remember right, though, Anzio was Churchill's idea and Clark wasn't the main man behind it.

How much responsibility for Anzio did Clark have?

Anyway, if I remember right, I managed to drive from Positano to Rome in about three hours. By that standard, Clark is clearly subpar.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Aacooper:


Anyway, if I remember right, I managed to drive from Positano to Rome in about three hours. By that standard, Clark is clearly subpar. The return of SuperLurker~!!

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Stipulate. Attest to. Agree. Not argue. y'know? No I did not, actually. Never heard it used that way, and dictionary.com did not throw it up as first choice. I only knew 'stipulate' in the form of 'I stipulate that condition', or sumfink. Thanks for enlightening me smile.gif

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Aacooper:
Somehow the discussion about Clark turned into an Anzio thread. If I remember right, though, Anzio was Churchill's idea and Clark wasn't the main man behind it.

How much responsibility for Anzio did Clark have?

Anyway, if I remember right, I managed to drive from Positano to Rome in about three hours. By that standard, Clark is clearly subpar. That is hardly fair, since you did not have to deal with German 10th Army (well, maybe German 10th Holidaymaker Army (mot)...) on your way :D

Not sure now who was responsible for Anzio in the end. It sounds to sensible a plan to be of Churchillian origin. The problem was the execution after all, on paper it looked alright. To reiterate, Clark's remark to Lucas 'Don't stick your neck out...' is often blamed for the cautiousness on the part of Lucas.

So what are your thoughts about Clark's interference in the break-out battles?

[General Bolt]

I am currently reading the book SALERNO covering the invasion of Italy. I'm only on D-Day for operation Avalanche. It was Mark Clark’s first major command.
He decided not to use a softening up shipboard bombardment of the area in order to achieve surprise. Clark’s underlings tried to convince him to release the naval guns before the invasion, yet he refused.
Even as the boats were approaching the shore it was known that surprise had been lost. Yet the bombardment was with held. The troops landed in the US sector were under intense attack, yet shipboard arty support was withheld.
The Brit naval commander removed the hold on SB arty way before it was lifted in the US sector.
Clark was a fool.

[Makes The Jelly Judder]

I agree, Clark was a fool. I have no evidence to back this up! Yet I have yet to read a single account that puts him a good light.

I reckon that if you select another General from all those available that you would have a 99% chance they would have been better than Clark, the other 1% would have been just as bad, not worse.

[Michael Emrys]

He might have made a very good staff officer under a capable commander. Giving him an independent command was a not a great idea. It's sort of too bad that he wasn't born four or five years later. He reached flag rank too early in the war.

Michael

[ August 12, 2003, 06:54 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]