How to attack like a German - sample forces

[JasonC]

How to attack like a German in large CM MEs or Attacks

5000 Point Panzer forces

13 Panther
2 SS Mot. Pz Gdr Company
2 SS Arm. Pz Gdr Platoon
6 Schreck
4 SPW 251/9
3 105mm FO

Tasking - Use 8xSPW 251/1 from the Arm. platoons to transport the heavy weapons. Make 2 support groups each with 2x251/9, 4x251/1, 2xHQ, 4xHMG, 2x81mm (using company HQs). These can operate full strength or in half sections. Use the dismounted Arm. Pz Gdr platoons for battlefield recon, each with 2 half squads backed by a "patrol" of 2x8 men plus HQ. Use the "patrols" to KO enemy half squad scouts. One Panther can support these scouts. The 6 Mot. platoons each pair with a team of 2 Panthers and form your main body. Keep at least 2/3rds, as much as all of it in a "fist", on a frontage of no more than 2 platoons. Follow the most promising avenue of attack found by the scouts. If you detach 1-2 of these platoons, use them for a fixing action or a feint before the main attack. The heavy weapons can go on either flank of the main body or participate in the fixing action. Wait on the artillery until you have driven the enemy into a contained space, then fire with the full battalion of 105s.

Or

14 Tiger I replace the Panthers
Add one veteran Mot. Pz Gdr Platoon
Only 2 SPW-251/9

Task as above, with a 7th platoon with 2 Tigers, may be used as a reserve or to add punch to the scouts.

Or

As original, but

4 King Tigers
8 Panthers

For tanks. Drop the SPW 251/9s. Upgrade one FO to 150mm or +3 schrecks or 81mm FO for smoke.

Don't mess around with the armor war in such large engagements, take a full company of high powered armor and just win it.

3000 Point Panzer Forces

12 Pz IV
1 SS Pz Gdr Company
1 SS Pz Gdr Arm Platoon
3 SS Pz Gdr Mot Platoon
2 SPW 251/9
4 Schreck
1 120mm FO

Less potent tanks but still a full company worth, working 2 per infantry platoon. Smaller heavy weapons section and limited artillery support. The last thing to cut is tank infantry teams.

Or

8 Panther or 8 Tiger instead of 12 Pz IV
-1 Mot. platoon with the Panthers, -1 schreck

Only a half company with heavier armor at this point level, so 1-2 platoons of infantry do not have tanks. They can lead or act as a reserve etc.

3000 Point Infantry Forces

10 StuG IV
Infantry battalion
12 schreck
3 105mm FO

Or

9 StuG IV
VG Battalion
Security Company
6 Schreck
3 105mm FO

A full StuG company supporting a full infantry battalion or more. You will need decent artillery support and infantry AT to suppliment the firepower of the StuGs. Fix the enemy with one company supported by 2-3 StuGs and your limited heavy weapons, and then attack on a 2-3 platoon frontage in depth with the main body on the other wing. Fire the artillery, massed, ahead of the main attack. Do not try anything too fancy on the maneuver and exploitation side, as your infantry may not be robust enough under fire to manage it. Just execute a wing attack, meaning break the enemy's left or right half of the field, while merely screening the remainder in front.

2000 Point Panzer Forces

12 Pz IV
4 SS Mot. Pz Gdr Platoon (2 veteran or +2 vet schreck)

Or

10 Jagdpanzer IV
5 SS Mot. Pz Gdr Platoon
3 Schreck
1 81mm FO (use for smoke)

Or

8 Tiger I
4 SS Mot. Pz Gdr Platoon
2 Schreck

Everything goes but tank infantry teams, in half company armor strength or greater, with 2-3 AFVs per infantry platoon. You can trade in one tank for 1 artillery module if you feel you must have some indirect fire support. Spend leftovers on schrecks.

2000 Point Infantry Forces

6 StuG III
3 StuH
3 VG Company
5 Schreck
2 105mm FO (or 120mm)

Again a company of armor but less capable types, and again with a full battalion's worth of infantry, and some sort of artillery support. The basic method of attack is as described earlier for infantry. Scout and fix with the VG rifles and one StuG platoon, fire the artillery ahead of the main attack, then hit them with everything else on a narrow front.

They all have in common using armor in company or at least half-company strength. (Combat AARs often show half company armor forces, often due to depletion of the parent unit). Tank infantry teams in a ratio of 1-2 AFVs per infantry platoon as the core of the force. A focus on winning the armor war, and then having enough ordinary squad infantry depth to overpower limited portions of the enemy force. Narrow fronts for the attacks help bring that about at first. Armor war victory brings it about later on, as surviving uncontested AFVs prevent portions of the enemy force from maneuvering to aid each other. Artillery limited in amount, and what there is used in focused, large missions tied to the maneuver plan, not dissecting the enemy position with a scalpel. Reasonable artillery support when the infantry arm is expected to attack.

With much smaller forces, let alone the point limits of combined arms force types, you can't realistically fight the way the Germans attacked. You need an armor force type, or unrestricted, and a large enough fight for AFVs to be on the field in at last half-company strength. You will only see the sense of it at the right scale.

When only a few tanks are present, they do not dominate areas the way they can when massed. When you are down to one tank platoon, it can do so if you keep it united, but that devolves into a straight firepower attack by that platoon. That is too tactical for the maneuver aspect - by which I mean the ability to fight only parts of the enemy force due to local or global armor war victory - to show up.

Note that none of the above are meant to be gamey optima in CM. They are realistic and they can show why the methods worked. Players often throw in a grab bag of items, dissipate their points over a half dozen vehicle types, etc. Way too complicated and unnecessary. 1-2 AFV types will serve, but massed, and the squad infantry is more important (on the attack, mind) than the twiddles of this or that foot team or gun.

[ June 25, 2002, 04:35 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Wisbech_lad]

And I can see why a posse of Typhoons/ Thunderbolts would also work to cut this attack column down before it got close to doing much damage! That and a front of 17 lb'ers/ 76mm.

Seriously, I look forward to trying this with PZIII/ PZIV in CMBB, or with IS2/ T34-85 going the other way.

Question (from this and the other thread on German tactics) Did the Germans learn much between 1942/1944? It appears that they persisted with "schwerpunkt" tactics, incredibly effective against fragile opposition, but by mid 1942 or so it seems that the Allies had mostly learnt to deal with it. The Germans then just try to do the same with thicker armour & bigger guns...

[JasonC]

They managed to get the initial break-in easily enough, even against later Allied defenses. The problems they encountered typically had to do with breakdown of combined arms when infantry got stripped off the tanks by artillery, or getting lost in a deep defended zone and hunted by reserves while buttoned, or having roads cut, mined, bridges blown, etc.

Sometimes they attack well prepared all arms defenses and just get their tanks shot out from under them. Thick front plates probably protected them from a lot of mistakes. Close terrain, poor visibility, etc, often evened the armor quality odds and then they generally did poorly when attacking.

But it is not like such techniques got them killed at the start line (at 17-pdr PAK fronts or otherwise - there weren't any, really). On the contrary, they virtually always made it through the front line. Just attacking on a narrow enough frontage with tactically serious amounts of armor can bring that much about. ATGs tend to be in penny packets, battery strength at most, all along the line, and are relatively easy to suppress or knock out.

Early in the war achieving an initial break-in was a more important thing to achieve, because the defenders against it mostly didn't know what to do about it. Early war Allied defenders did try armored counterattacks, but usually poorly coordinated ones with limited (if any) all-arms support.

German infantry coming through the breach in depth stopped those easily enough and turned a crack into a big tear. That didn't happen later on in many cases, because the Allies could "countermass" with artillery fire on the narrow breakthrough areas. Allied fire support and fire responsiveness increased drastically from early war to late. The German infantry could not shoulder through the holes to widen them. Once the tanks were stripped, they were hunted rather than hunters.

The only real counter to that the Germans had was scale, and operational surprise. If the attack was wide enough, the Allies couldn't mass fires everywhere to stop them. The Germans developed the idea that a whole panzer corps was the minimum force to launch a serious breakthrough fight, and two working together was considered much more sound.

They could also try to mass their own artillery beforehand and bring enough infantry depth to the attempt. They rarely were "rich" on the latter score after 1941, however, as the length of the front exploded and forces were needed to really hold them, not just screen them. If you look at early war operations, the infantry is in deep column behind the attack. In later war ones, everybody has frontage and too much of it.

Peiper and the attempt to take Bastogne both failed primarily due to not enough infantry with the lead units. By the end Peiper faced 10 to 1 infantry odds. In the attack on Bastogne by an entire corps, the guys inside the perimeter had as many infantry battalions as the attackers, and they were fresher. The break ins were one thing and there the doctrine worked well. Making something of, and sustaining a penetration was a taller order, and needed overall odds.

[ June 25, 2002, 06:18 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

How to Fight Like an American

5000 Point ME or Attack

All units Green

Infantry Battalion
2 extra rifle platoons (12 all told)
4 TDs
8-10 Shermans
6 105mm or 155mm FOs (yes, 6)
1 8" FO or Fighter Bomber
Jeeps (or HTs) for the 57mm ATGs
(Opt) 2 M-20s to spot for TDs

The main ideas here are (1) bring 800 men (2) bring more HE support than you can shake a stick at, preferably big caliber (3) fight the armor war on a shoestring with a few good TDs and an oodle of zooks.

Find him with infantry scouts. Blow the heck out of his infantry. When he goes for your armor, hunt them back with TDs kept out of sight until then, and pull back your tanks behind your infantry "shield". Don't let his infantry live to get through yours.

Broad front, reserves behind the line (in "second line") because some will break. Let them run if they won't stand the heat, seperating the forces with arty, or doing a relief by reserve forces.

At this point level, you have simply scads of teams. Use them to suppress everything in "up" deployments from range. Stay out of the 100m automatic weapon window. Interiors of woods, drop your endless supply of indirect HE on. Buildings, drop with plain Shermans.

Methodical, slow, chew through him. Keep the pace of battle at the pace of rallies, feeding troops back into the furnace after they recover from the last bout. If you lose the armor war, position zooks to block him and call down "final protective fire" from the off board guns. If the tanks come on alone, you ambush; if the infantry tries, it gets shredded; if he waits, you retreat and regroup.

Win the infantry and HE war, over time. If you waste your arty on inessential targets you will lose. If you put your HE on his infantry, he will run out long before you do.

3000 point level -

Still greens

2 companies
plus 3 platoons (9 all told, 2 weapon)
add 6-12 more bazookas (more if you like)
4 TDs
5 Shermans
4 big FOs, 0-1 smaller ones

Don't go under 9 platoons. Don't go under 3 big FOs (105mm or 155mm). Take the TD platoon and plenty of zooks. It is the depth of your vanilla tank support that is the first to go. You also have far fewer weapon teams, but still a lot of ordinary squad infantry, and some higher level HQs for rally purposes.

2000 point level -

6-8 platoons (e.g. company + 5 platoons)
4 TD
Shermans can be 0 to 5
2-3 big FOs
2 bazookas per platoon.

The armor drops, the FOs gradually get less godlike, the infantry stays numerous. The anti armor force - a TD platoon and lots of zooks - never goes away or gets any weaker.

I hope this is interesting.

[Paul T. Gardner]

Very interesting indeed JasonC.

Wisbech__lads' comment also hints as to why the Germans failed to sustain any of their breakthroughs, and links with you comment on their lack of infantry 'durability' in the face of artillery fire.

I think people overstate the effectiveness of Allied Jabos in hindering German AFV movement, (or at least certainly in destroying AFVs) and miss the more devastating effect on the German war machine of removing its airborne artillery.

In denying the Germans tactical air superiority, the part played by Stuka type aircraft was greatly reduced, thus removing this element from the Blitzkrieg 'formula'. I think one of the tasks of this element was interdicting enemy artillery situated well behind the front line.

Special thanks for the American 'TOE' for CM fights. I wouldn't mind fighting as the allies once in a while, but more often than not, my research leans heavily towards German matters, and leaves me somewhat bereft of knowledge on the Allies.

Rgds

[ June 25, 2002, 02:03 PM: Message edited by: Paul T. Gardner ]

[Chris Knapp]

How would that look for a British/Canadian force?

Similar to the US?

Chris

[Ari Maenpaa]

Originally posted by Paul T. Gardner:
I think people overstate the effectiveness of Allied Jabos in hindering German AFV movement, (or at least certainly in destroying AFVsYep, that's quite possible, but how often did the total air superiority help to unveil the forthcoming German attack and thus removed the surprise/shock effect? Meaning that the defending Allied land forces were already in full battlestations when the blow came. Or at least forewarned.

Ari

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Chris Knapp:
How would that look for a British/Canadian force?

Similar to the US?

ChrisLots of 25 pounder FOs, perhaps a squadron of tanks (15) for every infantry battalion, or a troop (4) of tanks for every infantry company? The tanks would be Sherman III or V, with every fourth one a Firefly (or 2 out of 4 being Fireflies late in the war).

After Normandy, throw in some WASP flamethrowers liberally.

Jason, you should change this to "How to attack like 5 or 10 percent of the German Army", since that is what the number of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions amounted to - and the number of those panzergrenadier battalions that actually had amoured halftracks was 50% or less.

How about a treatise on how the other 90 to 95 percent of the German Army attacked? I would be sincerely most interested in that. Didn't most infantry divisions have StuGs for support? How would they deal with anti-tank crises that arose? Or did regular infantry divisions simply not mount major battalion sized attacks on the western front after June 1944, leaving the assault role to the armoured units?

EDIT - ok, I now see you have regular infantry stuff in there. Very interesting. But my question still stands - how often did German battalions mount local offensives between D and VE Days? And how often were they "pure" divisional attaks and how often were they battlegroups from units across several formations?

[ June 25, 2002, 09:14 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[-Havermeyer-]

I only opened this thread (and I did so with great trepidation) to see how many pages I'd have to scroll down to see the first reply. Not too bad.

Guess I'll go back and read it now that I haven't lost my will to live.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Jason, you should change this to "How to attack like 5 or 10 percent of the German Army", since that is what the number of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions amounted to - and the number of those panzergrenadier battalions that actually had amoured halftracks was 50% or less.
Well, question is how many of all attacks did these few percent carry out?

Even if you change the count to consider divisions actually being in or in reserve behind active frontlines, the ratio changes drmatically.

Also, the Germans in general had more combat on the shoulders of fewer formations than other nations (I think they rotated the actual people more).

[CombinedArms]

Very, very interesting, as usual, JasonC. I've always thought arty was under-represented for the US forces in most scenarios (and if you put this much into a QB you'd probably be called gamey?)

My one observation is that US troops would eventually not be Green. They tended to acquire experience pretty fast in the ETO crucible.

Jason, any observations on typical defensive forces at each of these levels?

Also, I don't usually do QBs, but I'm wondering if anyone would like to try one with one of these force-mixes?

[Seanachai]

I thought "Like a German" was a song by Madonna?

I didn't know she and JasonC had collaborated.

[Redwolf]

One thing I find interesting is the Jagdpanzer IV usage and unit size. From my reading they were pretty parceled out, with only pairs operating in one area, when on defense. The only use of bigger units I stumbled across were when they were abused for attacks, like in the Ardennes.

[Paul T. Gardner]

Ari Maenpaa,

I understand your point, though from what I've read I don't think the 'unvieling' of German attacks was a particularly widespread occurance in terms of Allied tactical air superiority.

Sure, if you imagine swarms of Jabos over the front you might logically think that they are going to spot any 'attack' as soon as it kicks off. However, I think that most allied tactical airpower was fairly concentrated, and mostly flew CAP, or in the vicinity of a FAC once contact had been made.

Thus, although labelled as an constant threat by moaning German landsers, it was not quite as omnipresent as one might imagine. Importantly, it often arrived on the scene once a serious attack was identified, and in this respect, it was an important part of the Allied artillery response.

The point I'm coming to is that the chance of a German attack sliping under the 'Jabo net' were actually quite high, though once the attack was under way the Jabos would arrive on the scene quite quickly and contribute to the Allied riposte.

With regards Aliied alertness, I think from what JasonC is saying, ther Germans would often break through regardless. Therefore, if you couple this with my reasonably educated hypothesis, I think that Allied Tac-Air was not especially important in revealing German attacks.

Rgds

[ June 25, 2002, 02:26 PM: Message edited by: Paul T. Gardner ]

[Jeb]

CombinedArms, I'd be happy to have a go at playing an attack/defend with one of these force groups, looks to be an interesting fight.

Jeb

[Blenheim]

I thought that the Americans did something like this...

1. Advance.
2. Spot Germans.
3. Retreat a bit.
4. Call Artillery, planes and things like that.
5. Hell ensures.
6. Resume advance.

:D :D :D

[-Havermeyer-]

I like, and have already asked if someone would be willing (at the BoB)to do this in a simultaneous/simultaneous attack/defend from both sides (something like 4 games at once).

Given the attacking forces you postulate are amassed to create/exploit-- what would the defenses look like against such juggernauts? I'm not looking for balance or even a fighting chance in the defender-- just something such an offensive force might be arrayed against.

[JasonC]

To Paul Gardener - I do think the effect of Jabos on the Germans are overstated. But I also think the role of the Stukas early is also overstated. Of the two, I think the former made more of a difference (negatively). There are actually quite few examples of close air-armor cooperation in the early war successes. There was certainly no system of the tankers calling for air support, as later developed by the Allies.

The one standout where it was done right and seriously made a difference was the Meuse crossing at Sedan in 1940, where the Luftwaffe's mission was indeed to suppress artillery fire. They accomplished that by continuous, extended attacks by small formations (to keep it up). Which intimidated batteries into not fire "until it was over" (the air raids to them, in reality the crossing). That intimidation "multiplier" was critical to it making a difference, because the actual bomb-load the small air forces of the time could deliver in a day or two was very limited.

The Luftwaffe spent at least half its time in the early war period on other missions. Bombing of cities (Warsaw, Rotterdam), forward airfields to gain air superiority, attacks on communications. There was remarkably little early theorizing of the role of air power. The Meuse crossing use, for instance, was due to Guderian's personal role in the planning, and his close coordination with the air unit involved. Guderian's superiors in the army tried to get the Luftwaffe to do it differently, more in line with the "big raid" attacks the Luftwaffe normally used. It only went off as originally planned because later orders did not come in time. (See page 104 of Panzer Leader, paragraph begining "During the night I telephoned Lorzer...") Considerable advanced planning was absolutely required. It was not something they could do on the fly.

The Allies certainly got the impression that use of air was tightly coordinated with the tanks. That was largely an illusion created by overall success and by a few such cases. Guderian wargamed the Meuse crossing with Stutterheim (chief of close support planes, the Stuka guy) and with Lorzer, who commanded the air group used to support the operation. It was the wargame that convinced them suppression of artillery was the right mission. Nobody but them knew that bit of doctrine prior to the event itself. Guderian taught many of the leading armor guys, notably Hoth and Model. That spread the ideas somewhat.

But the leading German armor was still bombed by its own planes, lacked air cover once it got deep into enemy territory, getting strafed because of it. German HQs were hit by Allied air (in 1940) until they learned to stay out of the nice looking big houses. It was hardly the picture the Allies drew of tankers talking to dive bomber pilots on radios and calling them in where needed. In reality, the weak radio sets in the tanks often couldn't raise division. Truly tight air ground coordination, by modern standards, was not created until the Korean War CAS system.

To Chris Knapp - Sorry about having no Brits. The truth is I don't know their doctrines well enough to apply them parallel to these. I know what they had in what unit types, sure. But how they translated that into useful tactics on the ground at the tactical scale is another question. My general impression is that their armor forces typically tried to fight in something like the "German manner" depicted above, but with tanks less suited to it in gun armor terms. While their infantry formations fought more like the Americans above. But that is probably something of an illusion created by my understanding of those two "ideal types", and my using them as points of reference. I'd be interested in a British doctrine expert showing parallel forces and methods.

To Ari Maenpaa - YOu asked how often Allied air revealed a German attack and so deprived a German offensive of surprise. The answer seems to be "practically never". Some examples - when Rommel counterattacked as Kasserine, there was total operational and tactical surprise. They overran the forward regiment. When HG Panzer counterattacked in Sicily, there was tactical surprise. They overran a battalion. When the Salerno beachhead was counterattacked, there was tactical surprise. They overran one battalion and rolled up another on its flank. When Lehr counterattacked in Normandy in July, there was tactical surprise. They broke through the first line battalions in three different places. Mortain was known about beforehand, but not because of air. That one was compromised by Ultra intercepts. The force involved was still large enough to overrun most of the front line regiment, cutting off one battalion for days. The Lorraine counterattacks east of Nancy achieved tactical surprise. But still lost a number of the armor duels, in fog. The Ardennes Offensive achieved operational and tactical surprise. They destroyed the bulk of two US infantry divisions (106, 28) and tore multiple holes. The Nordwind attacks, delivered piecemeal in sequence and after the Ardennes, still were a surprise initially.

There is thus essentially no evidence that air superiority enabled the Allies to notice German offensive moves before they happened and be waiting for them. The only major armor attack they were truly waiting for was Mortain, and that was because of Ultra, not air power. "Waiting for" in that case meant 2 extra TD battalions ordered to the scene, an infantry division coming in on the northern flank of the attempt, and an armor division coming in on the southern flank. There was also a corps artillery grouping behind the point of attack, in part because of warning time. But none of those things stopped the initial break-in. The American line held at the "reserve combat team" line (penetrating all reserves prior to that). The amount of warning was a matter of days, because the whole attack was put together in a matter of days from conception to jump-off.

To Michael - The mobile divisions were well more than 5-10% of the German army. There were about 50 of the things by the end. 1/3rd of the formations that fought in Normandy were mobile formations. Yes, the infantry army was bigger, but most of it had defensive roles (and in Russia; we are talking about fighting the western Allies here). Infantry did counterattack and often. The doctrine was local counterattacks at every break in, and it was applied quite literally in scores of cases, by the infantry to. E.g. when a river was crossed, or any line breached, or a hill taken. The general method was wing attack or turning movement on one flank by roughly 2/3rds of the available force, in depth not on-line.

I showed those forces as you noticed later in your post. They typically did rely on assault gun support when used offensively. Sometimes they did not have them, or the terrain made them less than useful. In that case they did the same sort of thing - wing attack in battalion strength being typical, sometimes a regiment with one battalion doing a holding attack and 1-2 others the wing attack or turning movement. The last is a bit above the scale CM handles easily. If there were no assault guns, obviously more artillery would help. But they often did not have it, and short preparations were the doctrine anyway (for surprise).

To Combined Arms - Not green. By the meaning of the term, yes for most, although there were a lot of infantry replacements - on both sides - in the fall especially. In CM it is arguable that green quality depicts who average men behaved better than regular does. But also in CM QBs, you can go for quantity over quality by using greens, and that fits with a focus on winning the infantry-HE war because it gives you numbers. Large numbers of big FOs are also a lot more affordable as greens, and American artillery is fast enough that their greens still get missions down in reasonable times. On defense forces, I've written about German infantry&gun based defenses extensively before. For the Americans, more teams rather than squad infantry, and fewer supporting Shermans, but otherwise not far from the above types.

To Seanachai - I've obviously been heavily influenced by La Isla Bonita. But rumor has it that Walk Like Me by Blondie is more my cup of tea.

To Redwolf - Jagdpanzers were certainly used in company strength for attacks. They were pressed into this role due to a shortage of turreted tanks. Examples are the middle prong of Panzer Lehr's July Normandy attack, based on 2 Jagdpanzer companies (20 AFV), the right wing of the Bulge attack toward Elsenborn (identifiable Jagd-70s in company strength AARs). It was also apparently common to attach one company, sometimes more, to the divisional recce battalion when attacking, to give it punch, then use its light armor to attack through the enemy small arms and artillery zone. In US side AARs, you will often see "self propelled guns" or "SP 88s", or "mobile 88s" in sectors where the meaning has to be Jagds, given the units actually present on the German side.

[Skipper]

As one soviet general (don't remember who) put it "When you have more than 150 arty tubes per kilometer [of frontage], you don't report about enemy positions - only how far own troops advanced".

[JasonC]

Ideally such attack forces would be directed at a single company of defenders, at the front line anyway. Up-back deployments would put additional forces in their path, and send reserves scurrying into their sector. Though a large attack of 2-4 such groups side by side might limited the number of reserves any one prong encountered. On the downside, sometimes attacks were directed as much denser forces than expected, giving each prong like the above more like a battalion of defenders, even in the front line.

Suppose the target of one of the German forces are American infantry units, in mostly attack formations not really expecting a counterattack. And suppose the frontage the attack was delivered on was right. Then you'd expect (all greens) -

Front line force - 1350 pts (on map, dug in, forward positons)

US company
+ second Wpns Platoon
+ 2 MMG (6 total)
3 57mm ATG
1 81mm FO
3 105mm FO
2 TRP

Second line 350 pts (on map, dug in, "back" positions)

US Company minus one rifle platoon
+1 zook

Then the following "reaction forces" would arrive as reinforcements from the back edge of the map. Randomized arrival orders and times, from 5 minutes after the start onward. E.g. put all at 5 minute earliest with a 20% chance per turn. Or some at 5 minutes with 20%, some at 10 minutes with 30% or 50%.

TD platoon 500 points -

4 TDs
3 cavalry scout vehicles

With M10s, 1 Greyhound and 2 Jeep MG. Hellcats, 3 M20. Jacksons just 3 Jeep MG

Battalion Reserve 500 pts -

2 Rifle platoons
8 zooks
8 trucks

Artillery 200 pts -

1 155mm FO
1 Jeep

Sherman platoon 450-700 points -

4-6 Shermans (5 plain M4A3 a typical case)

Use the supporting Shermans only against the largest 5000 point attacking forces - when all arrive the odds will still be about 3:2.

Use everything but the Sherman platoon against a 3000 point force - when all reserves arrive the odds will be about even.

For a 2000 pt attack, use just the front line force, without the second line, plus the TD platoon and half the battalion reserve force as reinforcements later (platoon, 4 zooks, 4 trucks). The initial odds will be 3:2 and will fall to even when the reserves have arrived.

That will show the typical "layering" and response of the defense such a force could expect, when launched at the proper enemy force size along a properly narrow frontage.

Obviously, you can also just put the typical attack forces up against each other in a meeting engagement instead. But if the idea is to see what a German attack looked like and how it worked, then the above layered defense, with reasonable good initial odds and reinforcements rushing to the scene, will give a more accurate picture.

As you will see, the strong tendency to keep AFVs off the immediate front line (to use their mobility in reactive defenses, and to avoid drawing fire) made for comparatively weak AT defenses at the immediate front line early in the engagement. That was one of the things the armor-heavy German attack ideas were meant to exploit.

Thus the comparatively easy initial break-in, if enough armor is used on a narrow enough front. ATGs don't change this because they are necessarily penny-packeted all along the line.

Once into the defended zone, however, reserve armor arrives and bazooka teams stalk. Then it become important that the attacking infantry keep up with the tanks, because they will be needed for spotting vehicles, clearing bits of cover, etc. And that can be harder, because the "soft", anti-infantry side of the defense is considerably stronger (FOs, TRPs, dug in MGs, eventually plenty of squad infantry too).

I hope this helps.

[JasonC]

To Skipper - "When you have more than 150 arty tubes per kilometer..." Massing enough artillery was certainly used by the Russians too. But the relevant measure of artillery support is not the number of tubes (which as they calculated such things included all the mortars etc as well), but the number of rounds per day.

Ammo is the limit on artillery support, not tube numbers. A few battalions can fire hundreds of tons per day if they have the supply. Once the number of guns is decent, the rate of support "determiner" moves back to the transport links bringing shells to those guns. All the tubes in the world don't throw additional rounds at the enemy.

One battalion of divisional artillery can throw about a ton a minute. For 3-4 battalions that comes to 4000 to 6000 tons per day if they fired continually (which would burn out the tubes, of course). Even at sustained rates of fire, a division can throw 1000 tons of ammo in one day.

Nobody was able to move that kind of tonnage up to the guns, so the number of tubes was not what limited firepower. Actual levels of divisional supply typically ranged from 100 to 600 tons per day; the Germans considered 250 generous for attacks and as little as 100 adequate for defensive operations by infantry divisions. For everything, not just the artillery. Individual US artillery battalions sometimes threw 50-100 tons per day in intense combat.

Attrition warfare is not primarily about artillery, that is just the final delivery system. It is mostly about logistics, transport links, and applying overall economic capacity. The tubes are the hoses. The water is ammo and for practical purposes is made out of - and moved by - money, or overall wealth.

[ June 25, 2002, 06:25 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Redwolf]

Hm, is it realistic to have 3 57mm guns for a random infantry company in the frontline? Obviously other units don't take AT guns with them to the rear on rest, but still I think there were not that many.

[JasonC]

Yes it is realistic. Each battalion had a platoon of 3 57mm, and then there was an additional company of 9 of them at the regimental level. That makes 6 per battalion average, which were typically in 2 up, 1 back deployments. 3 per front line company is therefore standard. In some units, the divisional AT was towed 76mm rather than self propelled TD. Those could distribute 12 per regiment and thus 4x76 per battalion in addition.

You don't see them that often for the same reason you don't always see the battalion MG assets (here shown in the extra weapons platoon etc) and "spare zook" infantry AT platoons (shown in the battalion reserve force) - because the US was usually attacking rather than defending.

Some armor units cannabilized their 57mm platoons for added riflemen, because they were so short of infantry (only 3 battalions of it per division) and because they had plenty of equally capable AT weapons in the form of short 75 Shermans. Infantry formations did not have so much AT capability, and generally kept and used their 57mms.

[ June 25, 2002, 06:32 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Paul T. Gardner]

Originally posted by JasonC:
I do think the effect of Jabos on the Germans are overstated. But I also think the role of the Stukas early is also overstated. Of the two, I think the former made more of a difference (negatively). There are actually quite few examples of close air-armor cooperation in the early war successes. There was certainly no system of the tankers calling for air support, as later developed by the Allies. JasonC, the two cannot really be directly compared. Published accounts often speak of 'close air support' missions flown by Stukas during the Blitzkrieg campaigns early in the war. Most of these authors are ignorant of the true nature of this type of operation however.

Close air support operations are those mounted against targets in the battle area and in close proximity to friendly forces. Due to spotting difficulties experienced by Sturzkampf pilots from their nearly mile high vantage points (5,000 feet was the average start altitude for dive attacks), there was always a risk that bombs might fall on the very troops they were supposed to assist - as in your example.

Thus, in truth, for most of the time the dive-bomber's objectives were well behind the battle area - what would now be termed 'battlefield air interdiction targets', such as artillery and supply lines.

I've often wondered what the results would have been if Germany had regained control of the skies with its jets, and built a serious strategic bomber force such as the allies had. I think Overlord might not have been possible, and many Allied storage parks would have been bombed to hell. However, 'what if' threads can be very frustrating, so I shall stop there...

Rgds

[ June 25, 2002, 06:39 PM: Message edited by: Paul T. Gardner ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

Paul T. Gardner and JasonC,

thanks for replies. And for the interesting thread.

For a change I dug into the excellent online Carlisle library and glanced through General Depuy’s interview file. Depuy served in the American 90th Infantry Division and begun his combat service in Normandy 1944. His comments seem to correlate with what you said about the Jabos. Although it’s good to note that his POV is limited to that one division only.

Depuy: "Well, generally, we didn’t have any close air support. They didn’t have a system back then like we have now. There was no tactical air control system. When we first went to Mayenne and to Le Mans, they had Air Force officers in trucks with radios with our two lead battalions. That was the only time in the war that I saw that – the only time! They talked to the fighters, the P-47s and P-51s, and got them to attack the German tanks and troops that the column ran into. It worked pretty well. In fact, it worked very well."

On the other hand he really emphasizes the power of artillery:

"I really believe, based on my experience, that the combat power provided by the artillery, I’m sorry to say, probably represented 90 percent or more of the combat power actually applied against the enemy. That’s why I say that getting a forward observer to a high piece of ground and protecting him was the most important function that the infantry performed in that war. That’s not to degrade the infantry, it’s just objective analysis."

And the American artillery particularly:

"The artillery was good. It was technically very sound; more so than the Germans. It could mass more quickly and had better communications. I think the command and control and the fire direction techniques of the American Army were superior to the German Army."

"We had a lot of artillery. It was very good and we could always get lots of it. At the Saar and afterwards, it was not unusual for me as a battalion commander to be supported by five or six battalions of artillery anytime I really needed it. If I had a problem I could get it. Now, I didn’t use it all the time, but if I really had an emergency and I really wanted a lot of firepower, it was there. They could mass it and I could get all of it through my direct support battalion."

IIRC some time ago there was a discussion about Bazooka’s overmodelled performance in CMBO. This is Depuy’s take on the thing:

"The 2.36-inch bazooka could defeat a King Tiger only by a shot into the engine compartment from the rear, which was a difficult thing to do. The 75mm tank gun and 3-inch gun on the tank destroyers could not penetrate the turret or the front of the King Tiger. At short ranges they could penetrate the side armor."

Very interesting interview. Can't remember who initially recommended it here on the forum. Thanks to him anyway.

Ari

[JasonC]

"Due to spotting difficulties experienced by Sturzkampf pilots from their nearly mile high vantage points (5,000 feet was the average start altitude for dive attacks), there was always a risk that bombs might fall on the very troops they were supposed to assist...most of the time the dive-bomber's objectives were well behind the battle area"

The second part I quite agree with. I disagree with the first as a reason or excuse for either it or FF cases. P-47s regularly dive bombed from above 10,000 feet, and they were going twice as fast as the old Stukas did. They did not have serious difficulties IDing targets, and often achieved quite close cooperation with armor columns, attacking in squadron to group strength (12-36 planes).

Yes, there were occasional FF incidents. But tiny compared to those caused by medium and heavy bombers dropping from altitude, with miles-wide bomb scatter patterns - those were the main cause of Allied air FF incidents when they occurred. Tac air generally did not have such problems.

Part of it was relatively primitive radios. Part was early and relatively naive doctrine. But much of it was simply institutional - the Luftwaffe and army simply did not work very closely together, as many outsiders seem to imagine they did.

Individual officers showing high personal initiative sometimes worked out detailed, pre-planned coordination with particular air groups, for specific operations or series of operations. It was quite ad hoc. Such men either made such things happen by working closely with and visiting each other at their respective working HQs before an operation, or they did not.

The Luftwaffe was going for "battlefield interdiction" targets because they were operating largely independently. They were told in general, such and such force support the army along this axis or support this higher HQ. The air units so tasked went out and flew recon over that area and reported that to their army counterparts. They shot up targets of opportunity on the ground behind that area of the front - moving columns on roads, prominent buildings that might be HQs, whatever looked like a supply dump - all by the seat of their pants and according to their own intel gathered from their own flights.

That this had an impact on the enemy in that sector is obvious. That is was any essential doctrinal, closely coordinated thing worked out intellectually in advance is often assumed, especially by foreign observors, but is simply false. A journalist level understanding of the early war saw air attacks and tank breakthroughs as new and revolutionary things, compared to wars past. Occasional important fights showed marked coordination - like the Meuse crossing. People put 2 and 2 together and imagined it was all some master plan for air-land battle. It simply wasn't.

As for the real cause of the occasional FF incidents in the early war, it wasn't from blown sightings in failed attempts at true close air support. It was much simpler than that. The Luftwaffe was doing "battlefield interdiction" sweeps behind the enemy front lines - or so they thought. They just had no idea what positions their ground counterparts had yet reached.

Whenever the front line was moving fast enough, they were in danger of attacking friendlies on their sweeps, because long friendly columns of vehicles were traveling along roads in what the Luftwaffe guys still thought was the enemy rear. So were retreating enemy columns. They couldn't tell which was which. That was all. Nobody managed to tell them in real time (as opposed to 24-48 hours later - that much they knew) how far the ground units had advanced.

[ June 25, 2002, 07:18 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

Ari - thanks for the quotes. They fit my own understanding of the subjects mentioned very closely.

On the zook vs. KT match up, I think the issue there is how CMBO models armor quality. The right number for the front plate doesn't apply to the thinner side and rear plates. That makes the side of the KT no better than the side of a Tiger I, because the low quality offsets the sloping. In reality, the sloping would be there and not offset, making the side of the KT nearly as good as the front of a Tiger I.

The zook penetration numbers are probably a bit on the high side (e.g. it predicts regular penetration against T-34/85s, which we know from Korea did not happen). 80-85 rather than 90 is probably the right maximum, which would account for hard but possible side kills on Tiger Is, rear kills on KTs, but no side kills on KTs.

As for the short 75, I bet it could defeat the KT from the side with APCBC, rather than plain AP. In Normandy they had only the latter and had problems even with Tiger Is. By the Bulge they had the former (M61 rounds), and could KO KTs from the side. Instead of the one figure CMBO uses, it should probably be 5-10mm lower early on, and 5-10mm higher later on, as more APCBC became available.

[jtcm]

I tried your "2000-pointer" with green troops, Axis assault against US. It worked quite well, with the proviso that my opponent rushed his set up because I told him i wanted to go to bed a little earlier. So my apologies to him (if he reads this). Since we played green troops, i added 3 150 mm IGs, which played all over the central area. In 20 minutes the right flank was driven in, and infy plts wheeled left. The fog probably aided the assault, too.

Good night

[JasonC]

A useful report, thanks. The 150s undoubtedly help, though in towed form they deviate a bit from the doctrinal idea. I don't doubt they worked pretty well, though.

The Germans did use 150s with Panzergrenadier heavy weapons, incidentally, 6 per regiment. But self propelled "Bison" or "Cricket" AFVs, best modeled in CM by the Hummel. 2 Hummel added would be perfectly realistic additions for the Panzer forces given.

Which 2000 pt force type did you try?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:
Part of it was relatively primitive radios. Part was early and relatively naive doctrine. But much of it was simply institutional - the Luftwaffe and army simply did not work very closely together, as many outsiders seem to imagine they did.You are only talking about 1940 here I presume? In 1941 armoured FACs were quite normal in the Panzergruppen (attached to the advance detachments of the divisions), and in Spearhead for the Blitzkrieg (http://www.addall.com/Browse/Detail/1853672416.html), his contribution of the German officer monographs for the Army's historical division, Luftwaffe General Paul Deichmann complains about the involvement of even medium bombers in close-to and on-battlefield operations (suffering heavy losses in the process) instead of doing what they were supposed to be doing.

An early version of the RAF's 'bomb dependency' argument of 1944, probably.

[JasonC]

I am talking about 1940, yes. But I do not think it improved that much in Russia (some, sure). The Luftwaffe's spectacular achievement there was destroying most of the Russian air force on the ground in the opening days. Much of the rest was the same "armed recce" as in France.

Yes, the Luftwaffe complained about being tied to army support instead of what they "should" have been doing. But they thought what they should have been doing was bombing cities, so "supporting the army" means a heck of a lot more than true close air support.

Perhaps the problem is partly terminolgy. When I speak of true close air support I mean front line forces calling in airstrikes on enemy targets holding them up, in real time. There wasn't any of that yet. We will be attacking in sector D, put planes over D - certainly. We will try to reach Wheresville by dusk tomorrow, raid Wheresville - certainly. Sigint puts an enemy army HQ at Whatsits, raid Whatsits - certainly. Colonel Whoever to pilot, give me everything you've got on Hill 362 right now - not a chance.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:
Perhaps the problem is partly terminolgy. When I speak of true close air support I mean front line forces calling in airstrikes on enemy targets holding them up, in real time. There wasn't any of that yet. We will be attacking in sector D, put planes over D - certainly. We will try to reach Wheresville by dusk tomorrow, raid Wheresville - certainly. Sigint puts an enemy army HQ at Whatsits, raid Whatsits - certainly. Colonel Whoever to pilot, give me everything you've got on Hill 362 right now - not a chance.I understand what you mean. But if they were not capable of doing that, what was the point of putting an FAC into a HT and letting him trundle along the Panzerspitze when all that he achieved was getting himself in danger of being shot up in the process? The job you describe could as well have been done by him sticking to regimental HQ.

[CrapGame]

Played a 2000 pt ME vs the AI last night, as the Germans. I utilized 11 Mk IV H and 5 SS Motorized Platoons, 1 of them Vet, all the rest regular.

Using 1 regular platoon in split squad mode as a screening force supported by 2 Mark IV's, and each of the other 3 regular platoons supported by 3 Mk IV's a piece (kept the vet platoon as a reserve to exploit any gaps), I advanced the three platoons, 2 up, 1 back about 200 meters behind the recon force. I found a gap in the left flank of the landscape, and exploded through the AI's line at high speed, then wheeling right, advancing at a pace far faster than I usually do. It was interesting to see the result of the speedy advance, as the AI's arty calls were falling behind my troops, causing minimal damage to my forces. The AI eventually called arty on its own positions (did it do that intentionally, or did it retreat right into its own arty strike?), which caused them to completely capitulate, surrendering on Turn 24. It was very interesting to see how the AI's troops (all Vet Ami's) crumbled under the weight of the concentrated application of force.

Score 92-8, 40 Casualties for me, lost 1 Mk IV to a Sherm 76(W). 244 Casualties for the AI, who lost 2 Shermans, a Priest, a couple of miscellaneous light armors and 41 prisoners.

What a blast. Is that (11 Mk IV's, 5 platoons, no arty) a somewhat historically accurate attacking force? I suppose the result would be different in an attack versus an ME, but what fun.

[Farslayer]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But rumor has it that Walk Like Me by Blondie is more my cup of tea.
Ooooo, had lots of Shermans and it was a gas,

soon found out... they were made of glass...

[-Havermeyer-]

Thanks, JasonC. Do you really type at 300 words/minute? I thought it was only a story told to knew CMers.

[JasonC]

"what was the point of putting an FAC into a HT and letting him trundle along the Panzerspitze"

Mostly to inform the ground commanders what the Luftwaffe was likely to be doing, when, and what to expect as possible. For example, Guderian describes how his own Luftwaffe liason officer in 1940 gave them good advice on HQ locations, to avoid both friendly fire incidents and enemy air.

Is that over there the kind of target the Luftwaffe could spot and hit from the air? If I can get drive this portion of the enemy into retreating up that road, will the fly-boys be able to catch and clobber them? What is a good bomb line to halt along, to wait for a scheduled raid to go in before proceeding?

There are plenty of problems that the leading ground commander would like to have air force insight on, that can only be assessed by being there and seeing with your own eyes, and that only trained air force guys would understand.

[JasonC]

To CrapGame - yes, that is a perfectly realistic force. A slightly depleted Pz IV company with half a Pz Gdr battalion (or a full one, depleted).
They might have had 1 FO (105 most likely) instead of the 11th tank, and then yours could have done some of the work the AI's own did in your game. Bringing 10 tanks fast is a lot different than sending 2, cautiously picking their way forward by fire, isn't it?

[JasonC]

To Farslayer - LOL. How about (to the tune of "fade away and radiate")

Oo baby, I hear you spend nite-time
Wrapped like candy in a pale green CM glow
Blaze away, land navigate
Blaze away, land navigate

Oo baby, watch your lines
Cower pinned in brain wave time
Weapon teams move so slow
Burning tanks, faintly glow

Electric forces seem to emerge
Hidden units wreck your surge
...

The beams become my dream
My dream is on the screen
...

Foggy frames that still arise
Die in nineteen forty-five
...

[ June 26, 2002, 05:48 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[jtcm]

When I tried out a 2000-er, it was the infy version, so 2 Cos VG, some 120, 6 Stug-III, 2 StugH, five Schrecks.

Since they were Green troops and I had some left over points, i splashed out on 150mm IGs, and also (probably horribly impossible in historical terms) some 150 rkt, which i threw into the mix once action had started.

On the other hand, i tried to play the way you suggest for the scenario "Fire and Maneuver", but the long range AT fire quickly reduces any attempt at armoured fist...

[JasonC]

Too laconic, jtcm. You have to explain what happened in re "long range AT fire" and "armored fist". As for rockets, that might well happen but as prep fire really, and 120s plus rockets plus 150s direct is trying to win by HE, which is not the idea at all.

Note that my proposed force, even with regulars rather than greens, was 3 companies of VG, not 2. For infantry forces, a full battalion is wanted. I also had 9 assault guns rather than 8. So even with regulars, heavier on the maneuever elements instead of the fire support.

[ June 26, 2002, 10:01 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Tarquelne]

on map, dug in, "back" positionsHow far back....? Rhetorical question. What I'm getting at is:

Jason (or anyone) - How about suggesting a map size and general terrain? Maybe two sorts of terrain: Attacker friendly and defender friendly? (Esp. if there's a difference between the sort of country Germans or American's liked to attack through.) Turn limits and Victory flags suggestions? (To make the scenario "balanced" even if the forces aren't.) The force compositions and sizes - for both defender and attacker - look fun. As do the tactics outlines. (Thanks Jason.) Given those, plus the map/turn info, we'd have the framework for some really nice generic attack/defense scenarios. I can see using Jason's suggested forces and the "Auto Generate" feature (plus maybe some map tweaking) to create interesting scenarios quite quickly.

[jtcm]

Originally posted by JasonC:
Too laconic, jtcm. You have to explain what happened in re "long range AT fire" and "armored fist". As for rockets, that might well happen but as prep fire really, and 120s plus rockets plus 150s direct is trying to win by HE, which is not the idea at all.
Note that my proposed force, even with regulars rather than greens, was 3 companies of VG, not 2. For infantry forces, a full battalion is wanted. I also had 9 assault guns rather than 8. So even with regulars, heavier on the maneuever elements instead of the fire support.The long range AT fire refers to the training scenario, "Fire and Manoeuver", that comes on the CM CD-ROM: 76 mm fire over open ground 1000 m away.


Point taken about the emphasis on manoeuver elements rather than HE. I noticed-- as you pointed out-- that with a v. full complement of armour, I was less careful about micromanaging the placement of each time, just trusted more in speed and mass. But that might be wrong; and "Fire and Manouver", the scenario, shows that massed armour in the face of unsuppressed long range AT guns with interlocking fields of fire is not the way to go, speed or no speed

[JasonC]

To jtcm - may also have been an effect of StuGs. When you use the infantry based forces, you definitely want the AFVs to hang back behind the leading infantry, 200 yards or so. Because StuGs can be penetrated by most common Allied AT weapons from the front, and lack turrets to engage targets quickly as they appear.

Pz IVs are as vunerable, but the faster turreted ones (not J) can partially make up for it when moving in platoon strength (or at least paired), through rapid engagement speed. It is much easier to get away with "tank charges" with Panthers, Tigers, or Jadgpanzers (though the last is less than ideal, due to no turret). Because they bounce zooks, PIATs, 57mm and short 75mm from the front routinely. And those between them account for the majority of Allied AT weapons in realistic encounters, especially at the front line or before reserves arrive.

But yes, you do want to pay attention to how you drive the tanks, and you do want infantry to spot for the tanks. All my force and fighting method recommendations include infantry scouts, with half squads in front, preceding "patrols" of HQ plus 1-2 squads, meant to be strong enough to hit enemy half squads.

When there is a screening action on one part of the front, it should move to contact before the main body, too. That enhances deception about the point of main effort and it spots things before the main attack. Some forces recommend backing the scouts with 1-2 AFV. In those cases, the infantry scouts still go first; the AFV helping them is/are meant to engage e.g. enemy light armor doing counter-recon, that pin down your "point".

The speed part of the idea does not mean *start* with a tank charge. It means *when* the tanks engage, do so en mass - and likewise with the infantry, send a main body that is deep at only part of the enemy, rather than a line that is narrow and thin across the whole front. The main body should launch along *one* route that scouts have already moved over. The delay behind the scouts can be as short as 2 minutes, so it can still seem pretty fast. But some eyes do need to go first.

[JasonC]

To Tarq - typically the second line would be anywhere from 400 to 800 yards behind the first. It was not really meant to support the first while under attack, even by heavy weapons fire. It was meant to be a position the front could retreat to if necessary, and where reserves could reinforce, to "thicken" into a full front line again with minimal loss of ground, if the front line was lost. It should be close enough to *see* the front line, so e.g. it can call down artillery fire if the first line is taken. It tighter terrain, the seperation would be toward the low end of that range; in more open and especially hilly terrain, it rises, and conforms to available ridges or bodies of cover.

As for terrain, the most common would be farmland with moderate trees. That is open enough to be good tank country, because the farmland terrain type is relatively open for the same vegetation setting. Anything with light trees would also be good tank country, except a city obviously. The American style of fighting would prefer heavy trees if farmland, or village or rural if moderate trees. Obviously, the more cover, the more the tanks depend on their accompanying infantry to clear bits of it and create infantry-AT free paths of advance for the tanks. Since the US style of defense depends on stripping the infantry off and still having an intact infantry defense themselves, they want cover not wide open ground.

Againt the American style of firepower attack, on the other hand, the Germans want hills to hide behind in reverse slope defenses. That helps seperate the overwatch Americans rely on from their maneuver elements. Hills help defenders. But they especially help German infantry force defenders (who unlike armor, have limited range with infantry, while their ranged weapons are stationary) from firepower method Allied attacks.

As for size, the CM QB maps for battles this large are big, certainly big enough in width. They aren't always deep enough though. A 3:2 ratio of depth to width is probably more realistic for the sort of layered defense battle I described. To create reasonable maneuver possibilities, the absolute scale of the map must rise above 1 km, since otherwise individual strongpoints too easily cover the majority of the map. The more cover there is, the smaller the map can be and still allow meaningful maneuver. 2 km wide by 3 km deep is a good scale for the largest 5000 point force types.

Give the defender fully 2/3rds of the depth of the map on which to deploy at start up. But his front line force may be required to use e.g. only the forward 400-500 yards of that. Give the attacker 400-500 yards back to front (i.e. don't force him to line up without any depth in a 100 yard strip at the edge). The initial no-man's land does not need to be so far the two sides can't see each other. Realistic NMLs were sometimes as narrow as 200 yards between outpost lines, and rarely beyond 500 yards (MG range). Vehicles did not go right on those front lines initially, but that is a measure of prudence the players can decide for themselves.

So, layered, you'd have attacker set up zone, no man's land, defender's forward zone, defender's support zone, empty defender's rear area, with the defender reinforcements arriving in the last. Each on the order of 400-500 yards. Note that the last is essential. One, because reserves do not arrive right on the support line. Two, because it must be possible for the attack to get all the way through the local defenders, and thus behind even the second line, without going off the map. The maneuver consequences of breakthrough are masked if there isn't any open area behind the defender's line.

Force to space ratios, in terms of width, varied over the course of the war. They were high in Normandy, where the fighting was someone "claustrophobic" - and the terrain exceptionally tight in the US sector, as well. In those conditions a single US front-line company might have only 1 km to defend, not 2. That is part of what happened to Panzer Lehr's attack attempt in July, actually. The defenders were more like the size and composition of one of the US attacking forces given, meaning a full battalion on 2 km.

At the west-wall, force to space was less because the line length had expanded more than the forces had, compared to Normandy. And in the Bulge, the original attack sectors were thinner still, the thinnest on the whole front - at first. Dispersion of troops front to back ("meeting engagement" style confusions, 2-D rather than just linear maneuvering, etc) kept the force to space ratio relatively low in the Bulge fighting. But it climbed back to the "ordinary" levels, if not to Normandy ones.

I hope this helps.

[ June 27, 2002, 11:33 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:
To Farslayer - LOL. How about (to the tune of "fade away and radiate")

Oo baby, I hear you spend nite-time
[Snips]
...Hurrah! Prolonged, thunderous applause (as the stage directions for Stalin's speeches always used to say).

I look forward to suitably CMish versions of Blondine masterpieces such as "The Hardest Part" (the exact Brinell hardness being quantifed by Rexford), "Hangin' on the sound-power phone", "Giant ants from space" ("ants" here obviously being short for anti-tank guns), and, of course, "Youth nabbed as sniper, errrh, I mean sharpshooter".

All the best,

John.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by JasonC:
To Tarq -
<snip>
I hope this helps.Thanks much! How about suggested German defense configuration?

[JasonC]

A generic realistic German defense. OK. First one for 2000 or 3000 point battles -

Front line force (first 400 yards) -

1 rifle 44 company
2 extra HMG
2 81mm mortar (on map)
3 schreck
1 sharpshooter
1 81mm FO

plus

2 TRP
3 AT mine
10 AP mine or wire, any mix

Second line force (400-800 yards) -

1 rifle 44 company minus 1-2 platoon
1-2 schrecks
2 75mm Infantry guns
1 75mm PAK
1 105mm FO

If it is a 2000 point battle, the second line has only one squad infantry platoon. In a 3000 point battle it has 2, and an extra schreck. The force should be ~1367 for the former (3:2 initial) and ~1500 for the latter (2:1 initial). See the next for where the rest of the points go.

Then pick an "upgrade" option. You can choose one of the following -

(1) convert all 6 HMG into wooden bunker
(2) add 1 AT mine, 10 more AP or Wire
(3) add 5 schrecks, 3 up, 2 back position.
(4) add 2nd 105mm FO in rear position

Then give reinforcement groups, random arrival as with the Americans -

Battalion reserve -

2 Infantry platoon, 2 schreck (or company with no HMGs and 3 schreck in a 3000 point battle)

TD platoon -

3 Hetzer or StuG (any model) or 4 Marder

Artillery support -

1 105mm FO (additional)

When everybody arrives that should give ~2000 points, a bit more in 3000 point battles but still leaving odds (under 3:2 though). If your choices leave leftovers, add schrecks, sharpshooters, AP mine or wire with the leftovers.

In a 5000 point battle, the defender needs a stronger force. Put the 2x75mm IG in the forward position. Put 3x75mm PAK in the rear position, instead of just one. Make the rear position a full infantry company instead of being light a platoon, and give it a 3rd schreck.

Then make the reinforcement a full TD company - 9-10 StuG or Hetzer, or 12 Marder - plus a full infantry company (no HMGs), the same 105mm FO. Odd numbers get up to ~3333 for overall 3:2 odds after arrival go to schrecks with the reinforcement company.

So in a 5000 point, eventually the German defender will get a battalion of infantry and a company of TDs. Instead of as little as 2 companies of infantry and a platoon of TDs, in a 2000 point battle.

Not nearly as many guns as CM players like to use, but realistically they did not have that many. The infantry AT has a lot more of the burden to carry, until the TDs show up. On the other hand, there will be far more mines than most CM players use.

If you like, the reserve reinforcement infantry can be better armed, 2 LMG types - FJ or Mot. Pz Gdr - to represent more heavily armed "reaction" forces. (Even in Heer, some battalions had enough to equip 1/3rd or so at the 2 LMGs per squad level). The front line and support types could be security instead of plain rifle 44, for +1 SMG per squad and an extra weapons platoon HQ, etc.

Not anything remotely like a gamey optimum. But it is a realistic German infantry division defense.

[JasonC]

If you don't know how to set up and use that kind of force for a German defense, it may seem quite underpowered against the attacking American ones. But if you set it up right, it can hold out.

The main idea is to use reverse slope style deployments to avoid the attacker's overwatch weapons, tanks, and FOs. Try to draw him in close, trying to get LOS to your guys. This is especially true of your squad infantry, which you must protect very carefully. You don't have enough and he will try to run you out. So you have to be careful with them.

You must set up alternate positions, using split squad foxholes, incorporating a few buildings, etc. You will use these especially when you get shelled. You need covered routes back to them. If the enemy is about to cut your covered route, it is time to get out of there. When you see large spotting rounds, it is time to get out of there. If tanks have LOS, break it and get out of there. All with your squad infantry, understand.

Then you must construct traps all over the place, designed to catch probing enemy platoons and destroy them. This comes in many varieties - TRP artillery, AP minefields at the edge of fields, so they have to retreat a long way under fire after hitting them and not getting through, direct fire "keyhole" sight lines for the 75mm IGs, platoon ambushes at close range behind a crest line, AT mines and schrecks covering gaps between trees, etc. Use HMGs to deny open ground areas to his scouts, and to soak up his ammo. Site 81s to fire on likely overwatch positions (with an HQ spotting), or shoot them at a TRP.

Expect to lose the teams and guns while slowing him down and attriting him, and making him run through his ammo, both infantry small arm and artillery. Try to keep as much of the squad infantry as possible alive and falling back to each successive position. Never sacrifice it rashly in firefights you aren't winning anymore.

The support line can fire in defense of gaps in the first, places it does not put traps e.g. But its foxholes should not be directly observable from the foxholes of the first line, and it should be out of easy infantry fire range whenever such LOS lines can't be avoided. You want the attacker to have to leave the front set of holes to tackle the second line. Use the split squad ability in the back portion to make extra holes for squad infantry retreating from the front position.

You fight in this "trap and slink" manner behind your obstacles in the first line. Ideally, your reserve arrives in time to help with the stand at the second line. If you need to delay that event, use your artillery or unhide guns to buy time for the reserve to show up. When to unhide the PAK is a key decision in such defenses. Remember that you will have serious AT ability from TDs once they arrive, but until then it is all the ranged heavy AT firepower you've got.

Once the TDs show up, you should have a very good idea where the enemy is and where he is pressing. His armor should be trapsing through the remnants of your forward zone, trying to get LOS to the rear position, etc. Hunt them to blunt the attack. Put the fresh infantry (which may be better armed) in somewhere it can make a difference, or in you are ambitious a local counterattack.

What you want is the lead US tanks dead between your front and second line, as much of your squad infantry as possible alive on the second line, and the American infantry shot up, broken, and out of ammo. You may still have to play some "dodge" with falling heavy shells. Just watch for the spotting rounds and take them very seriously.

In the case of the 5000 point force, your TDs have to win the armor war in a big way when they arrive. StuGs are your best bet in that scenario size, because after they win it they will be needed for infantry stopping work. Note that the StuGs are relatively resistent to big HE, too.

[JonS]

HOW TO ATTACK LIKE THE BRITISH

What follows is a very stereotyped, planned attack {1} by part of a British infantry division, using bog-standard formations, set sometime between June – October 1944. A similar attack profile could be conducted with the Canadians. After October the types of vehicles will change, and the ratio of Firefly to regular tanks moves from 1:3 to 2:2 {2} . Also, support vehicles such as Crocodiles and Wasps become more common.

Readers Health Warning: It should be noted that I haven’t tried this line-up as I tend not to play QBs. It is presented as a companion to JasonC’s pieces on “How To Attack Like The Americans”, and “… Like the Germans”

5000 Point Scenario (attacker gets 7500 Points), unrestricted force type.

Basic Force:
Inf Bn{3} w/MG plt (Reg) x1
25-pr. Spotter (Vet) x 6
5.5” Spotter (Reg) x 2
= 4215 Points

Armour Force (all Reg):
Churchills (9 x VII + 2 x VIII){4} = 1681 Points
OR Shermans (9 x V + 3 x VC){5} = 1557 Points
OR Cromwells (9 x CromVII + 3 x ShermVC + 2 x CromVIII){5} = 1760 Points
(Shermans and Cromwells work in troops of 4 vehicles; three of standard and one Firefly. Churchills in troops of three MkVII, plus a small troop of 2 MkVIII){6}

Attached Force:
4 x Wolverine (Reg){7} (SP AT Tp) = 408 Points
4 x 17-pr. + 4 x M5 Halftrack{8} (Reg) (Towed SP Tp) = 552 Points
6 x Universal Carriers{9} (Reg) (for bn. engr. pn. in half squads) = 204 Points
1 x Rifle Coy (Reg) (reinforcing coy) = 379 Points
13 x Kangaroos{10} (Reg) (enough to mount one coy) = 663 Points
4 x Sharpshooters (Vet) (one per coy){11} = 88 Points
2 x 25-pr. Spotter (Vet) = 442 Points
1 x 4.2” Mortar Spotter (Vet) = 111 Points
1 x 3” Mortar Spotter (Vet) = 141 Points

Take the Basic Force, one of the Armour Force choices, and as many of the Attached Force options as can be afforded and will suit your needs{12}. You will still have some points left over, so use those at your discretion.

So, for example, you could buy the following:
Basic + Churchills + Wolverines + Kangaroos + Carriers + Sharpshooters = 7317 Points, leaving 183 ‘spare’ for a few more Sharpshooters, PIATs, etc{13}, or to upgrade the quality of some part of your force.

The Bn comes with four rifle companies, and the basic attack formation is ‘two up’, with two companies in reserve. Each of the leading companies also goes ‘two up’, with one platoon in reserve. Each platoon again goes ‘two up’, with one section in reserve. Each of the lead companies gets one of the troops of tanks in support. The other support elements are held in reserve or cover the flanks as required. Instead of having two companies in reserve, one could be used to conduct a feint, or attack a minor objective.

Prior to the attack carefully choose an axis of advance that you will be attacking along. The attack will be conducted with the two attack companies side by side, on a frontage of approx 120-160m (30-40m per leading platoon). The artillery will flatten this attack route ahead of the infantry with a rolling barrage.

Pick a line roughly 2-300m ahead of your where your lead platoons are set up along the Start Line. On Turn 1 target all six 25-pr. Spotters along this line, at a spacing of approx 30-40m, to give an artillery-frontage of 150-200m. Don’t go too wide, or there will be ‘gaps’ between the beaten zones of adjacent spotters. Once the rounds start to fall, advance the infantry up behind the barrage{14}. When they start getting too close, jump the line forward approx 100m and repeat. With the dispersion of the falling rounds you should get complete coverage at each line of a zone 200m broad by 100m deep, and as the barrage advances this coverage will be extended over the entire area of the attack corridor.

As an alternative to stepping forward by 100m every 3 minutes or so, you could sneak the fire forward a little bit every turn, to avoid the long delay involved in retargeting.

This barrage probably won’t destroy too much, but it should cause sufficient suppression to allow the infantry to continue moving forward, as long as they stay fairly close behind the barrage. It is important to keep the barrage jumping forward, and not dwelling too long on any line. Each of the Spotters has enough rounds for about 10 minutes of fire, and you need to have the infantry on the objective within that time limit. The total depth of the assault covered by the barrage will be on the order of 3-500m, which is another factor to consider when planning your attack.

The other indirect spotters (the battalion 3” Spotter and the two 5.5” Spotters, and any others you bought) can be used to engage any stubborn positions, to smoke the flanks of the corridor, or to engage targets off to the flanks. As a enhancement, you can change the two flank spotters of the barrage to smoke for the turn before they step forward so that the infantry advance between two lines of smoke (sort-of).

During the advance the tanks will be supporting it with direct fire{15}, and the engineers can be used to clear any minefields that appear.

Once the objective is taken, get the reserve companies up to secure and defend it supported by the battalion 6-pr. AT guns, along with any other stray elements. What were the lead companies can go back into reserve, and/or secure the flanks of the assault corridor.

This type of attack telegraphs your intentions to the German player fairly early, but as long as you keep moving forward and stay in a fairly tight fist you ‘should’ be ok. A particular concern is that all your units are moving along a single corridor, and are therefore vulnerable to German off-board artillery. Also, units on the flanks are largely ignored, so you may get a lot of flanking fire. Smoke along the edges of the assault corridor may help alleviate both problems.

For ‘assault’ scenarios you will have 8750 points available. Use these extra points to buy another 6 x 25-pr. Spotters (Vet) (to give 12 total) as part of the Basic Force. Use the extra spotters to form a parallel barrage line behind the first, to give a total beaten zone of 200m x 200m. When the infantry approaches the first barrage line, leapfrog it over the second, and so on. This extra line will give a much more effective barrage.

There will be less leftover points once the Armour Force has been purchased, and these can be used on items from the Attached Force list, and/or more engineer platoons, and/or another troop of armour, or possibly a pair of engineers tanks – Crocodiles or A.Vs.R.E.

2000 Point Scenario (attacker gets 3000 Points), unrestricted force type.

Basic Force:
In Coy (Reg) x2
3-in. mortar Spotter (Reg) x 1
6-pr. (Reg) x 2
Vickers MMG (Reg) x2
Universal Carriers (for Vickers and 6-pr.) (Reg) x4
Pioneer Pn (Reg) x1
25-pr. Spotter (Vet) x 4
= 2163 Points

Armour Force (all Reg):
Churchills (3 x VII + 1 x VIII) = 608 Points
OR Shermans (3 x V + 1 x VC) = 519 Points
OR Cromwells (3 x CromVII + 1 x ShermVC) = 510 Points

Attached Force:
2 x 6-pr. + 2 x Universal Carrier(Reg) (Towed SP Section) = 174 Points
1 x Rifle Pn (Reg) (reinforcing pn) = 127 Points
4 x M5 Halftracks (Reg) (enough to mount one pn) = 168 Points
2 x Sharpshooters (Vet) (one per coy) = 44 Points

Same mix and match as before. Same basic tactics, except on a narrower front, with one company up, and one in reserve.

For smaller battles, and you will have to forgo the barrage, as there simply won’t be enough spotters to make it worthwhile. Keep the 3-in. Spotter, and 2 x 25-pr. Spotters. Try to keep to the format of the Basic Force, centred on infantry with artillery and Armour Force support, fleshed out with Attachments.

For tactics, keep half to a-third of your force as reserve, and use what artillery you have in concentrations on identified targets.

Regards
JonS

Edit: Not surprisingly, John Salt took me to task on this :( , so I've included his comments:

{1} A nice Anglo-Canadian variation might be a night infiltration attack, either with armour (as per Ken Tout’s adventures on “Fly-by-Night”), or infantry alone (such as the KSLI’s night infiltration during “Bluecoat”). Unfortunately, CM:BO handles night combat poorly. I assume that we are dealing only with the formal attack or advance in contact here, hence the lack of recce vehicles; otherwise, there should be all sorts of light armour swanning around – and, as we’ll see, you can always use more carriers.
{2} Comet, obviously, has no 17-pounder or CS tanks mixed in.
{3} The CM:BO British infantry battalion as given is deficient in carriers, having only 10. 6 are needed to two the 6-pounders; 6 are needed for the mortar platoon, although these can be neglected as the 3-inch mortars are “off-table”; and the carrier platoon is authorised 13 of the things. The carrier platoon should have some 2-in mortars and PIATs of its own, as well, say 1 each per section of 3 carriers.
{4} This is an excessive proportion of CS tanks. There should only be 2 at SHQ, so 2 per 17 or so gun tanks. I don’t know what proportions of Mk VI to Mk VII are reasonable, but all VIIs is evidently a bit luxurious. I find it handy to mix VIs and VIIs to meet a particular pojnts value. An amusing game can be had trying to attack the AI with a “pure” Churchill squadron; at regular quality, 6 Mk VIIs, 8 Mk VIs and 2 Mk VIIIs make a full-strength squadron on almnost exactly 2250 points, which is what you get for a 1500 attack.
{5} If you have the points, you might buy all 4 sabre troops of a squadron, and the guns tanks from SHQ, which seem to be missing.
{6} Yes and no. Fireflies are normally mixed into the troops, but some regiments ran a centralised Firefly troop. CS tanks were nominally on the strength of SHQ, although “Villers Bocage Through the Lens” shows that the Sharpshooters dished out CS tanks to sabre troops. Cromwells from squadrons of an armoured division’s armoured recce regiment should not have Firleflies (though I believe they should have Challenger when it appears); Shermans representing DD squadrons should not have Fireflies either.
{7} For shame! Make them higher quality just for being Gunners! ;)
{8} Could also use a truck representing the Morris 30cwt.
{9} I am not aware of sappers being transported in carriers as a regular thing. Trucks would seem more likely to me.
{10} The other APC that one might see is the M5 halftrack, used by the motor battalion of an armoured division or “swinger” armoured brigade. Each company of a motor bn at full strength should have three rifle platoons each in 4 M5s, a scout platoon with 11 carriers, and Coy HQ with 2 carriers and 3 scout cars. They should not appear in the same battle as Churchills, which were found only in the independent tank brigades.
{11} Assuming for a moment that these represent snipers who’ve done the course and got the ghillie jacket, AIUI British sniper doctrine has always stressed operating in pairs. This is certainly the case now, and I believe it has remained unchanged for a very long time. It is also currently the case that snipers are authorised by the Bn CO, up to 8 pairs. They would probably not be affiliated to any particular company while sniping. If these do not represent proper “ghillie-jacketed” snipers, I don’t know what they represent, as I doubt anyone else could get hold of a scope on their G1098.
{12} This seems to me to be a good scheme that reflects the way British commanders handle “atts and dets”. You might also have a “funnies” add-on, including AVsRE and Crocs; unfortunately Crocodiles are so expensive that one is unlikely to see the advised minimum of a half-squadron, say 6 vehicles.
{13} I always buy PIATs and 2-in mortars as “makeweights” with left-over points. This strikes me as reasonable because quite o few of these weapons were authorised for people like the admin, AA, ATk and carrier platoons who might well be induced to “lend” them to the rifle companies.
{14} CM:BO’s artillery mechanisms don’t really let you do barrages terribly well. If you have a nice long battle and a big map, though, you might be able to advance down one flank and then turn through a right angle to attack across the table. I’ve done it a couple of times against the AI. The beaten zones then give a more barrage-like feel, and, if you have to fight to clear your start line, well, sometimes people did.
{15} Tanks might be in intimate support actually mixed in with or leading the infantry, or, especially if they’re not “I” tanks, jockeying along crest lines and shooting HE from up to 2000 yards away – as if ever see a 2000-yard LOS in CM:BO.

And similar comments for the smaller battles.

P.S. Thanks to those who help with this smile.gif

[ July 09, 2002, 07:36 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:
HOW TO ATTACK LIKE THE BRITISH
[Snips]
{12} This seems to me to be a good scheme that reflects the way British commanders handle “atts and dets”. You might also have a “funnies” add-on, including AVREs and Crocs; [Snips]Mr. Picky, who seems to be suffering a more than usuakl percentage of speling erros, should of course have written "AVsRE". ;)

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Shameless self bump, because I put a fair bit of effort into it, and I'm tired of Euros grumbling about CDV ;)

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John D Salt:
Mr. Picky, who seems to be suffering a more than usuakl percentage of speling erros, should of course have written "AVsRE". My unhinged cognitive function reads that as 'ARSE' when glancing it over. So maybe better not...

[desim8]

bump smile.gif

[Derfel]

Gents, (Jon S, J Salt and Jason )

I would be delighted if you would give me permission to publish an edited version of this thread on my website The Byte Battler (http://www.algonet.se/~jim/) among other "documents of interest".

I really do think these examples should be preserved for future generations... or at least available for a little while longer than it takes to fall from page one of the forum.

-Derfel

[Tarquelne]

Shameless self bump, because I put a fair bit of effort into it, Thanks, JonS!

We've played a couple smaller (2-3K points) of "Not so quick" QBs using the info in this thread. (Auto-generate map in editor, add units in editor, add a few more "suprise" units.)
The NSQBs have been fun. A nice compromise between scenarios and the sometimes bizzare and a-historic QBs.

In the one I played I controlled the Germans. With help of a lot of smoke (all of my extra points were spent on 2 81mm mortar FOs) I won while trying to closely follow the tactics Jason outlined.

I lost more tanks than I would have liked to, but I've never had the chance to chase several infantry platoons around with a few PzIV before, which was enjoyable. ;)

After I broke through the initial line I used the HT-based groups to keep the rest of the line busy and "tank-rushed" (At times I felt like I was playing TA) the rear area. The terrain was kind, and I ended up with several tanks in a position to tear up the reaction forces as they arrived.

My speed and the smoke seemed to allow me to avoid most of the American artillery. The infantry and the HTs (esp. the HT containing force) took some significant arty losses, but not the tanks.

My opponent grumbled about the American forces being Green, but we agreed our scenario was balanced. I was lucky more often than not, and next time we'll have some of the tracked reserves arrive off-road. My opponent wasn't familiar with the sort of defense he was fighting, too - I'm sure next time I'll have a much tougher time. (Note to self - significantly change tactics.)

The other NSQB was an American attack vrs. a German defense. The Germans won this one too. The first line got eaten, but the second line held. Close thing, though. And the attacking American casualities with the loss were much lighter than my casualites as the victoriously attacking Germans. Easy to imagine the American's grinding away at the German lines, day after day.

[Shosties]

*bump*

A blast from the blast as they say, mentioned in the recent first-timer AAR thread below.

Where does JasonC pick this stuff up AND have the time to type it up for us? :confused: :D Thanks!

The comments Ari dug up from the interviews of Depuy are good too. That's a lot of arty! And then grogish talk about CAS vs. battlefield interdiction and "blitzkrieg". It's a vertiable feast!

[Bruceov]

A brillant and informative thread. JasonC, are you a historian?

[Michael Dorosh]

Okay, JonS, just noticed this and am impressed.

John's comments on Carriers are well taken, in particular. But then again, how often would you ATTACK with them? They were more often used to evacuate casualties, prisoners, and to bring up rations, ammo and the rum ration...

As for snipers operating in pairs, this is true, but only one was of course a sniper; his buddy was a spotter (or "scout" perhaps? it being the Scout and Sniper Platoon).

[Bruceov]

Please post "How to attack like a Russian."

[Shosties]

*BUMP* This thread is so good I think it should be considered for a "sticky". smile.gif And I'd like to second Bruceov's request for a uebergrog post on "How to Attack like a Russian" in the bigger point battles. Anyone?

[Last Hussar]

To go back a bit.

The Ju87s didnt do any thing after May '40, because that was the last time the Luftwaffe had air superiority- the Battle of Britain caused stukas to be pulled out from front lines wholesale as any enemy air resistance caused horrific losses.

While FACs dont exist, Panzer Lehr and the 21st both suffered losses moving to the attack. These were enough to take the edge off when they did reach the front- though this is Operational rather than Tactical air power, and so out side the scope of CMBO.

The Ardennes offensive was planned for a period of bad weather- so the allies could not fly. The break in the weather is one of the reasons sited for the offensives failure.

Speaking of the Ardennes there is compelling arguements that SHEAF knew it was coming, and where. The German attack fell on the weakest part of the line. They forced a corridor which was lined by much higher quality defenders in natural defensive positions. (Brits north,Yanks south) The germans were chanelled until the trap sprung behind them!

The Brit creeping barrage method is accurate- and the move it slowly method is 'historical'. A freind of mine recounts how in the late seventies he walked as part of a line behind a creeping mortar barrage while on exercise. He is full of admiration as to how the Sgt co-ordinating the 'tubes' kept it moving forward at the same pace as the troops, with them just out of the blast radius. They basically would have hit any enemy just as soon as the shells stopped falling. I suppose with heavy enough armour, and light enough shells you cound get REALY close to the blast radius, and shoot at they cower. What a pity CM doesnt let troops hide behind vehicles.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Last Hussar:
To go back a bit.

The Ju87s didnt do any thing after May '40, because that was the last time the Luftwaffe had air superiority- the Battle of Britain caused stukas to be pulled out from front lines wholesale as any enemy air resistance caused horrific losses. Ahem - this is of course only true for the west, not for all 'front lines wholesale', and even there it should be June 1940. Ju 87 Stukas were effective until the last days of the war in the east, and certainly used a lot in the Mediterranean.

[Michael Dorosh]

Stukas were still being used in the west in Normandy, or at least, the war diarist of my regiment thought they were. They mention stuka attacks a couple of times while fighting south of Caen.

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Andreas:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Last Hussar:
To go back a bit.

The Ju87s didnt do any thing after May '40, because that was the last time the Luftwaffe had air superiority- the Battle of Britain caused stukas to be pulled out from front lines wholesale as any enemy air resistance caused horrific losses. Ahem - this is of course only true for the west, not for all 'front lines wholesale', and even there it should be June 1940. Ju 87 Stukas were effective until the last days of the war in the east, and certainly used a lot in the Mediterranean. </font>[/QUOTE]Funny, I thought I heard some stories about this fella named Hans Ulrich Rudel (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERrudel.htm) who flew a Ju 87. ;) Must not have been a "front line" pilot!

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Stukas were still being used in the west in Normandy, or at least, the war diarist of my regiment thought they were. They mention stuka attacks a couple of times while fighting south of Caen. Those could be Ju-88, unless the war diarist specified the specific model.

[Last Hussar]

Okay okay- maybe I overstated.
:-0

However stukas were always very vunerable

[Silvio Manuel]

Originally posted by Shosties4th:
*BUMP* This thread is so good I think it should be considered for a "sticky". smile.gif And I'd like to second Bruceov's request for a uebergrog post on "How to Attack like a Russian" in the bigger point battles. Anyone? I know of just the thing. Check out the old thread I bumped "How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944" by Grisha. Enjoy!
SM

[Andreas]

Since Grisha and I are not split personalities, I need to point out that I started that particular thread. I would also like to point out that unlike Jason's thread, it is not at all aimed at how to play CM with the Soviets. It is a historical discussion that may or may not have some interesting points relating to CM, but certainly won't tell you anything about which units to choose in CM battles, or how to employ them.

[Shosties]

I'm staring a thread over in the CMBB topic area with links to these two threads. Seeing as this is the CMBO area we should maybe not generate too much Soviet-related traffic here now. ;)

[fridericus]

defending in german schwerpunkt (most important point in area) is quit simple in theory. mg-post see enemy attacking, announce it. counterattack starts and attacking enemy is thrown back.

*g*

[Shosties]

BUMPed for the 11000, 12000, 1300 series members. ;)

[Other Means]

Andreas et al mean this thread (which i've got bookmarked).

How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944 (http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=1;t=025686).

in deference to their wishes, please do not post about it in the CMAK board.

[coe]

The question I have on attacking like a german - late in the war, it feels at least by what I have read that the Germans were still able to do significant penetrations against the russians whereas against the allies, the german attacks seemed to peter out (exception Ardennes) after a few miles or so. Is this a somewhat valid conclusion and if so, why.

The second thing is I've read several accounts of the Germans successfully infilitrating Allied lines in company to battlion levels but then the Allies seem to stomp them out (western allies), Were the germans equally unsuccessful in infiltration of russian lines and likewise when Russians inflitrated German lines, how did the germans stomp those out?

Conan

[flamingknives]

Can't comment on validity, but the western allies had significantly more responsive artillery system. Few things spoil a counter-attack more than a victor target on the main body.

[Andreas]

coe - a bit general. What sort of operations are you talking about in the east?

[coe]

well even in 1944 August and October the germans had several counterattacks (I think somewhere in the south (Romania?) and even spring awakening had more than a 10 mile advance too given it was that late in the war.

[Andreas]

You are probably thinking of Hungary for 1944 as well. Those were relatively fluid battles from what I know, not attacks into settled frontlines. Anyway, they did manage a more serious penetration in the Ardennes at a later date.

In October two German divisions attacked and achieved a good dent near Overloon against US and British forces, so I don't think there were many differences between the Red Army and the western allies in this respect.

10 miles is neither here nor there, considering the amount of forces the Germans concentrated for Spring Awakening. A similar concentration of armour did not exist in the west post-Ardennes, otherwise it would most certainly have made a 10 mile impression as well.