How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944

[Andreas]

Funnily enough, this is actually CM size, at least when you look at the map size.

Iasi-Kischinjow Operation, August 1944 (Kischinjow would probably be called Kischinew in German unit histories)

Operations of 3rd Ukrainian Front (GOC General Tolbuchin)

Main effort of the front is in the sector of the 37th Army (GOC Lieutenant General Scharochin). Main effort of 37th Army is 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. The 37th Army has a 4km wide breakthrough frontage assigned to it. It is divided in two groupings, two corps up, one corps reserve. According to plan, it is supposed to break through the depth of the German/Romanian defense in 7 days, to a distance of 110-120km, with the distance to be covered in the first four days 15km each.

66th Rifle Corps (GOC Major General Kuprijanow) consisting of two groupings (61st Guards RD, 333rd RD up, 244th RD reserve). Attached are 46th Gun Artillery Brigade, 152nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 184th and 1245th Tank Destroyer Regiment, 10th Mortar Regiment, 26th Light Artillery Brigade, 87th Recoilless Mortar Regiment, 92nd and 52nd Tank Regiment, 398th Assault Gun Regiment, two Pioneer Assault Battalions, and two Light Flamethrower Companies.

Corps frontage 4km
Corps breakthrough frontage 3.5km (61st RD 1.5km, 333rd RD 2km)

Densities per kilometer of frontage:
Rifle battalions 7.7
Guns/mortars 248
Tanks and assault guns 18

Superiority
Infantry 1:3
Artillery 1:7
Tanks and assault guns 1:11.2

There is no man-power information for the divisions, but expect them to have between 7,000 - 7,500 men each, 61st GRD maybe 8,000-9,000. The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they had to attack, and being brought up to speed on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector.

Density in 61st GRD sector per kilometer of frontage:
Rifle battalions 6.0
Guns/mortars 234
Tanks and assault guns 18

Density in 333rd RD sector per kilometer of frontage:
Rifle battalions 4.5
Guns/mortars 231
Tanks and assault guns 18

The initial attack
333rd RD did not bother with niceties like reserves and put three regiments up. 61st GRD attacked in classic two regiment up, one reserve formation. This proved to be lucky, since its right wing of 188th Guards(?) Rifle Regiment got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. 189th Rifle Regiment on the left wing made good progress though, as did 333rd RD on its left. The GOC 61st GRD therefore inserted his reserve (187th GRR) behind 189th RR and off they went. When darkness came, 244th RD was inserted to break through the second line of defense. It lost its way though, and only arrived at 2300, by which time elements of 13th Panzer were counterattacking.

The German/Romanian opposition was XXX. and XXIX. AK, with 15th, 306th German ID, 4th Romanian Mountain Division, and 21st Romanian ID. 13th PD was in reserve. At the end of day one, 4th Romanian Mountain, and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while 15th and 306th ID were heavily damaged (according to a German source: 306th lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strongpoints by evening). Almost no artillery survived the fire preparation.

13th Panzer counter-attacked 66th Rifle Corps on day one, and tried to stop it on day two but to no avail. A study on the divisions history says 'The Russian dictated the course of events.' 13th Panzer at the time was a materially understrength, but high manpower unit, with a high proportion of recent reinforcements. It only had Panzer IV, Stugs and SP AT guns. The division was at the end of the second day in a condition that it was incapable to attack or of meaningful resistance.

At the end of day two, the Red Army stood deep in the rear of German 6th Army. No more organised re-supply of forces would be forthcoming, and 6th Army was doomed to be encircled and chopped up. Franz-Josef Strauss, who was to become a very important German politician after the war, served with the Panzerregiment of 13th Panzer. He comments that the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit on day three of the Soviet offensive: 'The enemy was everywhere.'

The comment on the result of 66th Rifle Corps operations in Mazulenko is: 'Because of the reinforcement of the Corps and the deep battle arrangements of troops and units the enemy defenses were broken through at high speed.'

This post is based on two German language sources, one being Mazulenko, 'The destruction of AG South Ukraine', and the other Hoffmann, 'Die Magdeburger Division', a history of 13th Panzer.

This is what the Red Army saw as a late war set-piece attack. It is a relentless meat-grinder, that was protected by Maskirovka, full control of the air, and prepared with almost scientific rigour. This kind of stuff made Blitzkrieg look like Kindergarten.

Almost exactly after a month the Red Army had destroyed AG South Ukraine completely. On the 6th September it had reached the Jugoslavian border at Turnu-Severin, on the 16th September it stood in Sofia, on the 19th it had reached the Hungarian border at Arad. Before that, on the 17th the old lands of the Danube Swabians at Temeschwar (Timisoara) were occupied.

I posted this because I thought some people maybe interested in this rather 'secondary' theatre, and also because it is one of the few accounts I have come across that details almost down to battalion level for some aspects the organisation and preparation for a Soviet offensive of this scale.

[ July 20, 2002, 10:18 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Funnily enough, this is actually CM style, at least when you look at the map size.[snip]Andreas,

Thanks for that. Very interesting. I look forward to the CMBB scenario conversion and after-action report!

Toodle pip!
Nigel

[Blackhorse]

Andreas,
Very nice post.

I can only imagine what it must have been like to see that juggernaught approaching one's own lines.

Cheers,
Chris

[Andreas]

Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann)

A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann)

A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)Andreas,
Indeed. It must have been pure hell on the receiving end of that attack.

The Attritionists won that day eh?

[Moon]

7.7 rifle battalions per kilometer frontage? Cough... I wonder if each rifleman had to carry another soldier to fit them all into that space smile.gif

Martin

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Moon:
7.7 rifle battalions per kilometer frontage? Cough... I wonder if each rifleman had to carry another soldier to fit them all into that space smile.gif

MartinMy mistake, it is 6.0 for 61st GRD and 4,5 for 333rd RD, actually. 7.7 is over the whole frontage of 66th Rifle Corps. I will edit that.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Blackhorse:
The Attritionists won that day eh?Don't they always ;)

I am sure they did some beautiful maneuvering after 24th of August though. Encircling two Army Groups, rushing to the Romanian borders, and all that.

[von Paulus]

Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ? :rolleyes:
But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

Paulus

[imported_argie]

Originally posted by Von Paulus:
Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ? :rolleyes:
But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

Paulusummmmm... If you didn't noticed, it is historically true, then, a bit more than totally possible...

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Von Paulus:
Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ? :rolleyes:
But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

PaulusErr, this is an historical attack, please read the info on the sources again.

And no, they were not full strength. The divisions were (as I said) at far below strength, it is therefore logical to assume that their consituent parts were below strength too. The authorised strength was ~9,200 men based on the 1943 shtat. These divisions are at about 80% of that.

One way to deal with that was to lose specialist personnel. Interestingly, according to Zaloga in order to reach 8,000 men division in October 1944, 3rd Ukrainian Front (the front undertaking this operation) ordered a specialist TO&E under which each rifle platoon would lose a squad. So the rifle battalions here would have about 2/3 TO&E strength. Assume a bit more for 61st GRD, since Guards divisions seem to have received more reinforcements.

Still, at 4.5 rifle battalions to a km, and 2/3 strength, you are effectively putting 3 full-strength rifle battalions in there per km. Open a CMBO map and have a look at what that looks like.

The Germans were heavily outnumbered at this point (as they were at many other points). But this did not happen because of some accident, or because the Germans overlooked something. It was the result of successful planning, Maskirovka that led to the Germans expecting the attack elsewhere or not at all, and consequent superior concentration of overwhelming force in a narrow breakthrough sector. Once resistance there was smashed, rapid movement would bring about the complete disintegration of the German rear areas as well as troop command and control.

[Grisha]

The deception operation of the Yassi-Kishinev operation also contributed greatly to success. German intelligence situational maps had the 7th Mech Corps placed in the operational rear behind 5th Shock Army when in reality it was across the Dnestr bridgehead within the 37th Army sector, prepared for exploitation. A discrepency of over 60km.

[Michael Emrys]

Andreas,

Was the troop density achieved by putting the companies of battalions in echelon with some interval between them? Thus, they would be attacking in waves with each succeeding wave arriving just as the preceeding one started to run out of steam? This would seem to me to be a reasonable thing to do in this case, but I am unsure if that is the technique they actually followed. Does your source indicate?

Michael

[Andreas]

Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here.

Basically the assault battalion was organised in two waves, as was the assault regiment and assault division, as I understand it. They also formed one or two battalions for specific tasks (e.g. assault strongpoints, or night fighting).

In operational analysis, the Red Army appears tp use this frontage idea regardless of depth. What is hidden behind that is that the organisation extended not only in space, but also in time. Reserves that were an integral part of the assault organisation, or a different unit, would be committed at the point where things go well, and not where problems develop (see e.g. the commitment of the reserve regiment by GOC 61st GRD in his attack - he does not bother using it to overcome the strongpoint). Reinforcing failure seems to have been out of vogue by 1944.

[Andreas]

Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory. Source is the November 45 Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM 40-430. Thanks to Kip for the scan.

http://www.beobachtungsabteilung.derkessel.de/betaboard/SovietAssaultBatt.jpg

[ May 21, 2003, 04:50 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory.Ah well, but it doesn't really answer my question. While it shows how groups were organized (i.e., their components), it doesn't show how they were deployed in the attack.

Michael

[Andreas]

Would that help? Same source.

http://www.combatmission.com/articles/handbook/Soviet_Assault/fortified/v118.jpg

[ May 21, 2003, 05:04 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here. If you get clearance I will be pleased to see that.

This is the big nutty question about how the Red Army went about its business. We all have this conception of herds of men, like a flock of sheep, being pushed forward anyhow.

The attack frontages that you quote are spookily similar to those used by the British Army in Jul 16 on the Somme. The key difference I suppose is the crushing weight of artillery deployed by the Red Army.

But this raises the essential question of how the Red Army attacked: was it just herds of men plodding forward shoulder to shoulder (a la Somme) or was there something more sophisticated going on there?

This is a critical problem for CMBB. As tactical wargamers we expect to encounter a measure of balance - it makes for a fair (and therefore an interesting) fight. The art of the operational commander is to ensure that an attack is a foregone conclusion: no fairness, just overwhelming victory - as seen above. Where does this leave the tactical wargame on the horrific broad canvas of the Eastern Front?

[Grisha]

Determinant,
"Plodding like herds of sheep?" This might have been the case in some instances in 1941 or even 1942, but by and large Soviet troops did understand such concepts as tactics ;)

Soviet tactics were pretty much like everybody elses really, it's just that they didn't have the same level of command control or initial training. Experienced Soviet troops were every bit as adept at their job as the next nation, but just went about it in a different manner. By mid-1943 assault tactics came under great scrutiny, resulting in the devising of ad hoc combined arms assault groups tailored to the needs of the situation. These assault tactics were based on experience as well.

Soviet losses were also the result of their inability to rely on on-call indirect artillery to assist in a new development on the battlefield - or bail them out of a bad spot. Their own solution to this was to have many more self-propelled assault guns (SUs, ISUs) on hand for infantry support, but it wasn't quite the same thing as a barrage of incoming. Kind of the difference between the USMC and the US Army, the former relying on their own organic firepower, the later, on additional assets, i.e. artillery and air power.

[Michael Emrys]

Ugh. Double post. {how do I manage to do that?}

[ July 20, 2002, 04:13 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:
Would that help?Ahhhhhhh! Very cool! That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...

:cool:

Michael

[ July 20, 2002, 04:12 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Mud]

Determinant --

I'd figure that there are plenty of "fair" fights available, especially when looking only at a limited tactical action, and when considering that attacks were also made under less-than-ideal conditions (e.g. far from dominating ratios, insufficient supplies, communications snafus...). And the very first units in an assault may encounter a "fair" fight for at least a while. If the first hour or so of a battle is even enough to be interesting, that should be good enough for a single battle; there may even be "fair" operations, depending on the victory conditions (e.g. if the attacker needs to go a long distance, then the forces don't need to be that even...).

Remember: CMBB is a tactical wargame. It deals with small actions, mostly. Even if one side largely had the upper hand at any given time, it doesn't mean it had it /everywhere/ and /everywhen/ (e.g. every 0.5-1 hour or so that might be turned into a CMBB battle).

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:
That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...
MichaelEbay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mud:
CMBB is a tactical wargame. It deals with small actions, mostly. Even if one side largely had the upper hand at any given time, it doesn't mean it had it /everywhere/ and /everywhen/ (e.g. every 0.5-1 hour or so that might be turned into a CMBB battle).Indeed. Looking at my first post from the scenario designer's PoV, there is an obvious instance that could become a CMBB scenario. The right wing of 61st GRD that got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. Obviously the German/Romanian occupants of that strongpoint failed to get the message and kept resisting the juggernaut to a degree that necessitated readjusting plans on the Soviet side. Sounds like a CMBB operation in waiting to me.

[Tero]

Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:
That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...
MichaelEbay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.</font>[/QUOTE]You could always offer to photocopy it for the poor, desperate lad. It's not illegal if the book is out of print. It's only illegal if you charge more than your costs. ;)

[Andreas]

Michael, I would consider that, except that I do not actually own it or have access to it. I have just got a couple of pages scanned.

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by tero:
Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?That is always the hard part....

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Runyan99:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by tero:
Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?That is always the hard part....</font>[/QUOTE]Quoting from Mazulenko again:
Climate: Warm and windy, dry. Medium daily average of 15°C in the second half of August.

Terrain: '70% of the bridgehead south of bendery were covered by forests and gardens (meaning farmland?); there were few good roads. Paths had to be made through thick underbrush, which severely restricted the mobility of Soviet troops. Lakes and swampy areas led to a splitting up of formations. There were no commanding heights inside the bridgehead. Lower lying areas suffered from a high ground-water table (40-80cm below ground) making the construction of gun and tank pits as well as trenches difficult. In some areas trenches had to be created by piling up earth, and tanks supported by logs. [...] In the area of combat black, heavy soil is dominant, with some clay. After heavy rains and during the flood season in spring and autumn the country lanes soften up and are difficult for wheeled vehicles to drive on. [...] The network of country lanes, alleys, and particularly the rail network was poor; there were few villages inside the bridgehead. The majority of settlements was on the rivers, in gorges and valleys.'

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Great post by Andreas.

Just to reinforce a point already made above by a number of people. It is worth bearing in mind that by September 43 Soviet losses per 100 frontline riflemen, per combat day, had fallen to the same level as those of US frontline riflemen. Life was tough in all frontline units, but Soviet units did not suffer the mass slaughter in 43 that many German accounts report/assume. This in part will have been because, by 43, the Soviets were largely using the same tactics as everyone else. Even in Soviet “lessons learnt” documents from late 41 you see the same comments one gets in US “lessons learnt” documents from Normandy. To give a specific example, in late 41 the Soviets were commenting on the need for attacking infantry to concentrate on engaging targets as they advance.

(In the above calculation it was assumed that each Soviet infantry battalion had only 300 men, each US infantry battalion 500 men. That is Soviet casualties were spread between less “lots” of 100 men than was the case for US casualties. This reflects the reality that Soviet infantry battalions were generally maintained at the lower level of manpower than US infantry battalions. Yet their losses per 100 frontline men, per combat day, were still the same.)

All the best,
Kip.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Paths had to be made through thick underbrush, which severely restricted the mobility of Soviet troops.

It did ? ;)

Lakes and swampy areas led to a splitting up of formations.

German or Soviet ?

In some areas trenches had to be created by piling up earth, and tanks supported by logs.

How were they disguised (if at all) ?

The "auftauchen" bit made me think the Soviet troops managed to burrow in and dig trenches all the way up to and inside the German defensive perimeters.

The network of country lanes, alleys, and particularly the rail network was poor; there were few villages inside the bridgehead. The majority of settlements was on the rivers, in gorges and valleys.'

Sounds like the German defences were poorly designed, given the terrain and the restrictions it presented. Trenches constructed so they were clearly visible.

Or the Soviet had all the positions mapped and pinned down. No doubt they had rehearsed in exact replica mock ups in comparable terrain too.

[PzKpfw 1]

From 1944 - 1945 an Soviet Rifle Divisions frontage on an attack, was 2500m, a Rifle Bns frontage was 700m, on an attack, a Rifle Co's frontage on the attack, dropped from 350m in early 1944 to 100m by late 1944. Because of decreased manpower levels in the Rifle Div.

The Soviets provided them with very lavish supt, Ie, each Rifle Co had 2-3 artillery pieces & 3-4 tanks or SU's provideing direct fire suport for the attack. Soviet Rifle Divs were low priority on replacements.

By 1945 attrition in Soviet Rifle Divs had taken it's toll Ie, the 262nd Rifle Divs, 950th Regt was down to 2 Bns & miscellaneous units for a total of 631 effectives.

The 91st Guards Rifle Regt was down to 1 Rifle Bn with an 161 men. Add in the Regts AT, Mortar, & an SMG co etc & the 91st had about 400 men out of its authorized 774 men. The whole Div was down over 2000 effectives that could not be replaced due to manpower shortages. 5th Army in the Baltic reported 11 of its Rifle Divs had an average strenght of only 2,625 effectives, in March 1945, this was down from an average of 3000 - 3200 in Febuary 1945 and this was in an 'quiet' sector.

The Shtat for an Soviet Rifle Co in 1945 was reduced to 53 effectives, An Rifle Co consisted of 2 Platoons of 23 men each. During the Berlin fighting the average Rifle Div Strength was was under 3000 effectives in 12 Rifle Co's. The Rifle Co strengh had been reduced by attrition to 20 - 30 men each Company.

The reason for the strength decrease was not because the Soviets could not replace the losses. The Soviets chose to create new tank & Artillery formations instead of replaceing Rifle losses.

Regards, John Waters

[Geier]

Thanks Andreas. Great thread.

[Aacooper]

I don't have the foggiest notion on a larger map where this battle took place, but if it happened in present-day Ukraine, or the parts of Russia to the east, then http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/soviet_maps.html might have a 1:100,000 map of the area.

[Michael Emrys]

John,

Did the soviets ever disband any of their understrength units to flesh out the rest or to provide experienced cadres for the new formations they were raising?

Michael

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:
John,

Did the soviets ever disband any of their understrength units to flesh out the rest or to provide experienced cadres for the new formations they were raising?

MichaelYes & no, Michael in 1941 they did disband Divs that were to depleted to rebuild but this seems to have been an exception as they generaly tended to try & rotate an Regt, Bn, or Co when it was heavily depleted to te rear to try & keep an experienced cadre. They prefered to rebuild an Div then disband it because an disbanded unit had to be replaced wheras, it was easier just to rebuild an Div. Generaly what they did later in the war was take the returning wounded that in most cases, were not allowed to return to their original units but were instead sent to other RDs who needed experienced cadre.

Ie, we can look at Soviet Rifle Div officer replacement Regts which at their peak in 1943, had between 200 - 4,000 officer replacments, some had 7,000, but by 1944 the average # had decreased to only 500 - 1000 officers in the replacement Regts.

By November 1943 the Soviets had to disband their Rifle Brigades to provide Rifle Div replacements Ie, the 4th & 125th Rifle Brigades were disbanded to rebuild the 212th Rifle Div alone.

Other measures were taken as well Ie, in September 1943 the RDs reduced their gun crews from 9 to 6 men & sent the surplus to the Rifle Cos as replacements. By December 1943 the RDs were conbing out their rear service personell for replacements Ie, the 336th RD had to use 40% of its rear services personell, to replace its Rifle losses.

In June 1944 2nd Guards Army combed out its rear service personell, of all men from 40 - 45 years of age, just to get each Rifle Div up to an strength of 400 men. They also resorted to combing out hospitals etc.

Below is an example of the average Soviet Rifle Division Company strength from Sept 1944:

32nd Rifle Div - 40 men.
43rd Rifle Div - 60 men.
70th Rifle Div - 50-70 men.
77th Rifle Div - 50 men.
119th Rifle Div - 35 men.
145th Rifle Div - 35 men.
179th Rifle Div - 40-75 men.
204th Rifle Div - 77 men.
268th Rifle Div - 60 men.
306th Rifle Div - 60 men.
379th Rifle Div - 30-40 men.

The Rifle Bns were reduced to just 2 Rifle Co's & an SMG Co in most cases.

Regards, John Waters

[ July 22, 2002, 01:26 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, John. From your figures it sounds like by late '44 many rifle divisions had about the equivalent of two battalions for their entire infantry complement. Taken together with whatever effects on artillery effectiveness may have ensued from reducing gun crews, these were divisions in name only, probably being somewhat less effective than an American RCT, one should think.

Michael

[Andreas]

John, I would be interested to see if you have data on 37th and 27th Army in 3rd Ukrainian Front, because it does not look as bad as the data you have. The strength data I have is as follows:

27th Army
104th Rifle Corps
</font> 206th RD 7077 men</font> 4th Guards Airborne 9277 men
</font>35th Guards Rifle Corps
</font> 3rd Guards Airborne 7257 men</font> 180th RD 7359 men
</font>Unfortunately Mazulenko gives no data for 66th Rifle Corps. Judging from the relative homogeneity of these strength returns, I would assume the three divisions of that Corps to be roughly on that level too.
Could the difference be because of the fact that this is before a big offensive, while e.g. your September figures are post a big offensive?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:
Originally posted by Andreas:

Lakes and swampy areas led to a splitting up of formations.

German or Soviet ?

In some areas trenches had to be created by piling up earth, and tanks supported by logs.

How were they disguised (if at all) ?

The "auftauchen" bit made me think the Soviet troops managed to burrow in and dig trenches all the way up to and inside the German defensive perimeters.

The network of country lanes, alleys, and particularly the rail network was poor; there were few villages inside the bridgehead. The majority of settlements was on the rivers, in gorges and valleys.'

Sounds like the German defences were poorly designed, given the terrain and the restrictions it presented. Trenches constructed so they were clearly visible.

Or the Soviet had all the positions mapped and pinned down. No doubt they had rehearsed in exact replica mock ups in comparable terrain too.tero - the information here is from Mazulenko, and concerns the Soviet side. The Soviets had the MLR completely mapped, but unlike e.g. in the offensives in AG Central sector, did not send long-range scouts behind the enemy lines.

The trenches would have been a problem for both sides, probably more so for the Soviets, since the Germans had the advantage of the terrain.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

the information here is from Mazulenko, and concerns the Soviet side.

OK.

The Soviets had the MLR completely mapped, but unlike e.g. in the offensives in AG Central sector, did not send long-range scouts behind the enemy lines.

There was no partisan activity in the area ?

BTW: almost no Axis arty survived the preparatory barrage. How far behind the line were they ?

The trenches would have been a problem for both sides, probably more so for the Soviets, since the Germans had the advantage of the terrain.

I still wonder the use of the term auftauchen. It translates "rise to the surface", right ? I know for a fact the Red Army dug trenches so they could get closer to the enemy positions in preparation of assaults like this. In comparable wet/marshy terrain too. Is there anything mentioned about the Red Army preparations for the assault ?

[Andreas]

tero - in this sense it means "appear/suddenly appear".

I do not know the distance to the MLR from artillery positions.

Mazulenko specifically talks about long range scouts. Maybe they were seen as more reliable than partisans.

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Andreas:
John, I would be interested to see if you have data on 37th and 27th Army in 3rd Ukrainian Front, because it does not look as bad as the data you have. The strength data I have is as follows:


Andreas, I will see if I have anything. It would be interesting to see, how many of those effectives, were in the Rifle Co's, vs how many were suport personel. The Data for September was an sample of the average strength of Rifle Div, Rifle Regts, Rifle Companys; only it does not state it was post offensive etc.

Some Soviet formations were favored Ie, they recieved priority in replacements as well. Also I would add these levels were not considered bad this was an choice the Soviets made to build new Mechanized & Arty formations out of the replacement pool that would have refurbished the RDs .

One thing to remeber is the data in my 1st post, look at the frontage, & paticularly the fronage an Rifle Co attacked on 100m, then look at the suport, the Co was given in tank/SU & DF artillery pieces. This was more suport then any Allied Inf Co, German Inf Co etc, recieved. And was the start of the Soviets switch to giveing their riflemen maximum support Ie, quality over quantity, in late 44-45 with large ammounts of tank/SU & Artillery supt available.

Regards, John Waters

[ July 22, 2002, 11:06 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Grisha]

John & Andreas,

Posting good data here, many thanks. Regarding replacements and TO&E, two things should be kept in mind as well. 1) As John stated, better units ('better' meaning better combat performance) were kept at official Shtat levels, whereas poor units were sometimes reorganized drastically to 2/3s of Shtat TO&E. This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:
This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.It looks to me as if this was what happened, and 3rd Ukrainian Front brought the assault divisions near Shtat (is that the right term to use?).

Interestingly, 66th Rifle Corps drops off the narrative after 2 days of the operation after an action at Kauschany Wek. A map of the encirclement has them at the outer Eastern edge, indicating they had a fairly 'easy' job. This could indicate that they were hit by the breakthrough operation to such a degree that they needed a bit of R&R. In that case, they would lose the attachments, and these would scuttle off doing what they do best elsewhere.

I have scanned a map that shows German defenses in the strongpoint of Leontina, and should answer some questions about positioning of guns etc. This is the sector that was attacked by the other Rifle Corps of 37th Army, 6th Guards. Unfortunately the division is not given, and neither is any info on statistics relating to the unit. The attack itself was carried out by 30th Guards Airborne Regiment on 20th August 1944.

http://www.beobachtungsabteilung.derkessel.de/webimages/leontina1.jpg

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

This could indicate that they were hit by the breakthrough operation to such a degree that they needed a bit of R&R.

That would be in line with other reports of similar operations. A spearhead unit would be expended and it would remain behind while other elements go past them to press the attack home.

In that case, they would lose the attachments, and these would scuttle off doing what they do best elsewhere.

Which attachements are these ? The support elements ? I'm not sure they would be transferred outside their assigned infantry battalions/regiments. They might dig in with the spent infantry to form a defensive perimeter around the objective in case the counter attacks were succesfull.

I have scanned a map that shows German defenses in the strongpoint of Leontina, and should answer some questions about positioning of guns etc.

It does. But it also raises a few more concerning the events.

1) What kind of guns were they ? Only 2km's from the front line would indicate their max effective range was not more than 5 km. One explanation could be they were field guns and not howitzers and if there were obstructions (hills etc) that they could not fire over and hit the designated fire zones. Or they were prepared to fire direct fire support as well as regular fire missions.

I think mortars they were not, if I remember my tac markers correctly. smile.gif

2) Why were they grouped so tight together so close to the front ? 12 guns (3 batteries, approx 50% of the arty in this sector) of them in a 1sqkm box. Was that standard SOP ?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:
Which attachements are these ? The support elements ? I'm not sure they would be transferred outside their assigned infantry battalions/regiments.

2) Why were they grouped so tight together so close to the front ? 12 guns (3 batteries, approx 50% of the arty in this sector) of them in a 1sqkm box. Was that standard SOP ?A few answers. The support elements would be the plethora of additional tank and artillery that I listed in the first post.

No idea what guns they were. I would suspect they were so close because this was a strongpoint in the frontline. Probably ATGs, IGs, captured Soviet 76.2mm guns etc.pp. I would expect the heavy artillery to be further back.

Some translations I forgot last night:

SB - Rifle Battalion (Soviet)
GLR - Guards Airborne Regiment
Gut - Manor House/Farm
IR - Infantry Regiment (German)
ID - Infantry Division (German)
Geb.Div. (rum) - Romanian Mountain Division
Am Morgen des - on the morning of
Am 20.8. gegen 14 Uhr - 20/8 at about 1400

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:
What kind of guns were they?I'm not perfectly familiar with the tac signs on this map, but based on their placement I would guess that most of them are AT guns. Indirect fire artillery other than mortars is almost certainly located in an area not shown on the map.

Michael

[Runyan99]

It looks to me as if this was what happened, and 3rd Ukrainian Front brought the assault divisions near Shtat (is that the right term to use?). I believe so. Shtat = Authorized Strength

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The support elements would be the plethora of additional tank and artillery that I listed in the first post.

OK. It was unclear if you meant the organic support elements or the general support elements.

No idea what guns they were. I would suspect they were so close because this was a strongpoint in the frontline. Probably ATGs, IGs, captured Soviet 76.2mm guns etc.pp.

What kind of terrain does the rounded terrain marker stand for ? Height gradient ?

I would expect the heavy artillery to be further back.

That would be reasonable. Still, "most" arty assets being KO'd by the perparatory barrage would suggest the arty got special attention.

BTW: the reason this arty business interests me is the break through attack the Soviet troops made against the Finns in June 1944 saw the loss of most of the artillery of the formation in the focal point of the attack. But they were lost because they could not be moved out of harms way (horses and tractors detailed to farm work too far away), not because they were KO'd by the preparatory barrage. The guns were approx. 5-7 km's behind the front line because like most Finnish arty the max range of the guns was 10km's or less.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

If some of you are looking for the document from which the above tactical and organisational diagrams are taken what you are after is Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM30-430, November 1945. The chapter on tactics is available from The Nafziger Collection, is part of the same series of books that are available from BTS themselves. The entire Handbook is “very rare” and I am very fortunate to have copy, however, there must be others out there.

Do a search using google.com and you will certainly find the chapter on Soviet tactics is commercially available.

All the best,
Kip.

[Grisha]

Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.

[Andreas]

Grisha, yes please.

[Grisha]

Will do, Andreas. Please give it 6 hours from now when I will be home from work. Sorry for the delay.

[Zitadelle]

Originally posted by Grisha:
Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.Hey Grisha, add me to that list for the maps if you please....

[Michael Emrys]

Actually, if there is any way for them to be put up on a website and a link posted here, I'm sure many of us would appreciate it.

Michael

[Soddball]

Any data on how the flamethrower units made it to the front of the attack? Mine are usually about 4 miles back and reach the battle on turn 99 of a 100 turn scrap smile.gif

[Grisha]

Sure, Michael, I can do that.

[Michael Emrys]

Cool! Thanks, Greg.

smile.gif

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Soddball:
Any data on how the flamethrower units made it to the front of the attack? Mine are usually about 4 miles back and reach the battle on turn 99 of a 100 turn scrap smile.gif Just hazarding a guess, maybe they started with the initial attack waves? In which case, they must have been much better protected by their accompanying inf than is the case in CMBO.

Michael

[Grisha]

Okay, I just finished the website for the Yassy-Kishinev deception maps. I've made a shameless plug for the book I obtained these from, but Col. Glantz is a truly amazing historian and deserves more credit than he receives. Btw, the site is at my friend's own private server, so while a little slow there is none of the hassle of ISP bandwidth, etc. I've also linked a Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception to the site - and don't worry the link is to my own site not a .mil site, so the Brits can have a crack at it too smile.gif

[Click here (http://www.adamfive.com/guerrero/maskirovka/)]

[Grisha]

Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland smile.gif

[Commissar]

Wow, thanks Comrade. More material that'll make the lives of the Wehrmacht cultists very unbearable. I can already hear the claims that, "This game bites because the Russians don't suck enough" already. :D

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Just hazarding a guess, maybe they started with the initial attack waves? In which case, they must have been much better protected by their accompanying inf than is the case in CMBO.

This brings up also the question about their battlefield mobility (along with other "heavy" assets like HMG's). Are the heavy infantry assets too slow relative to the regular infantry movement speeds ?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Grisha:
Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland smile.gif Small world, eh? smile.gif

I think there are a bunch of guys in the Seattle area. I got an e-mail from somebody a year or so ago (I lost the mail in a computer crash and don't recall who it came from) who was getting some people together to play h2h. I don't travel so well anymore, so I had to bow out, but left open an invitation to get together if anybody ever came this way. I never heard anything further, so I don't know what happened. I leave the same invitation open to anybody coming to P.T. Send me an e-mail and we'll arrange to meet somewhere for a beer or three.

BTW, thanks for the maps. I printed them all out and will study them tomorrow when I get some time. Also downloaded the article and will give it a look. This is an area I don't know much about, so the information is appreciated.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:
This brings up also the question about their battlefield mobility (along with other "heavy" assets like HMG's). Are the heavy infantry assets too slow relative to the regular infantry movement speeds ?If you mean in CM, I don't generally think so.

It will be interesting to see which speed class they place the Soviet Maxim HMG, the one on wheels.

Michael

[Andreas]

Grisha, great stuff. Much clearer on this than the maps in Mazulenko. I guess I will at some point have to read this article. smile.gif

The maps show very well the massing in the breakthrough sectors, and how it was achieved. Very interesting to see them alongside the Mazulenko account.

[Grisha]

Like I said before, glad to be of service smile.gif Anything that furthers knowledge of the Soviet-German War is well worth the time and effort spent.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:
The maps show very well the massing in the breakthrough sectors...During a casual perusal of the maps last night one thing really jumped out at me, and that was that German Intelligence had misplaced the 53rd. Army over a hundred kilometers east and across a major river from its true location. It must have come as a shock when they met it in battle. Other mistakes may have been more important to the conduct of the battle, but that one really caught my eye.

Michael

[Andreas]

tero, I have found the gun information. I wanted to post some more about the fight at Leontina anyway, so it is contained in that.

Leontina was a very strong strongpoint at the junction of XXX. and XXIX. AK. If it fell, the defense of the MLR opposite 6th Guards Rifle Corps (the other corps in 37th Army) would collapse. It was defended by one company of 580. IR, and a battalion of 549.IR, both of 306.ID. Translating the following directly: Also in support of the fascists were one detachment (Abteilung = 3 batteries) 10,5cm and three mortar batteries (no calibre, expect 81mm or 120mm) which were situated one to two kilometres south of Leontina.

Translating again: The Soviet attack was supported by three divisional artillery detachments, connected by radio. [...] The initial barrage knocked out most of the fire support of the enemy strongpoint as well as the aritllery and mortar batteries south of Leontina.

30th GAR was supported by one battalion of 19th GAR. When the strongpoint was cut off at 1400, a battalion from 4th Rom. Mountain Division was sent in to relieve them, but it was destroyed when attacking the outer ring of the encirclement in 19th GAR sector.

The fight must have been vicious, and quite mercyless. At 1800 hours, Leontina was cleaned of the enemy. On the battlefield, 1,200 dead fascist soldiers and officers were left. 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

[sturner]

Reading this brought two images to my mind, the first was that of a Napoleonic Corp attacking.

The second was what I dreaded during my tour in Germany, '79-81. The Russians, if they came across would present such a target rich environment that we would go through our Battalions entire basic load of ammunition within the first hour and a half. It would take my Support Platoon about 4 hours to return to the Ammo Dump, which probably would be under chemical attack or air attack, for resupply. And even then they would only be allowed to draw half of our basic load for the Tank company and two Infantry companies. Within the first day of combat, we would be down to throwing rocks, and my logistics units would be part of the front line... as it moved through us.

[ July 25, 2002, 10:18 PM: Message edited by: sturner ]

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:
During a casual perusal of the maps last night one thing really jumped out at me, and that was that German Intelligence had misplaced the 53rd. Army over a hundred kilometers east and across a major river from its true location. It must have come as a shock when they met it in battle. Other mistakes may have been more important to the conduct of the battle, but that one really caught my eye.You hit on a very important observation, because it wasn't a one-time anomaly, but a result of the development of deception, or maskirovka by the Soviets.

In Glantz' book on the subject he says this within the Introduction:

The growth and development of Soviet military art and science has been evolutionary, and heavily dependent upon experience. The structure and focus of this study reflect the extensive dimensions of Soviet military experiences in general with particular emphasis on surprise and deception. In the Second World War the Soviets conducted nearly 50 major strategic operations and over 140 front (army group) offensive operations. The fronts ranged upward to 500 kilometers with depths to 650 kilometers - each involving between 300,000 and 2.5 million men. In virtually all of these operations the Soviets attempted, with varying degrees of success, to achieve surprise through deception.

The scope of these efforts reflected the magnitude of those military experiences. As early as December 1941 at Moscow, the Soviets were able to mask the offensive employment of three armies totalling over 200,000 men. In November 1943, near Stalingrad, the Soviets secretly redeployed, concentrated, and attacked with major armored forces which encircled elements of two German armies. Just over a year later, in December 1943 west of Kiev, the Soviets secretly employed two tank armies and two combined armies to drive German forces irrevocably west of the Dnepr River. In the summer of 1944, in Belorussia Soviet deception measures concealed from German eyes the redeployment and subsequent offensive employment of two armies, a tank army, and several tank corps numbering over 400,000 men and 1,500 tanks. On the eve of the Vistula-Oder operation (January 1945), German intelligence failed to detect the presence of six Soviet rifle armies and one tank army and only tentatively detected another rifle army and two tank armies, a total force of almost one million men and over 2,000 tanks (about 40 per cent of the Soviet force used in the January offensive).

The ubiquitousness of Soviet deception, and the futility of attempting to understand strategic and operational deception from an examination of a few selected cases, require a comprehensive view of all operations - lest a critical segment of that deception be overlooked. A comprehensive view must also capture failure as well as success, for a review of successes only would belie the fact that successful deception is immensely difficult to achieve.

[Mike]

Russian use of surprise is well documented a long wayback. One of the most decisive battles of WW1 was Brusilov's offensive of 1916. Then the Russians smashed the Austro-Hungarian armies opposite them in a huge surprise attack.

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Mike:

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

What made them so different was their willingness, or better preparedness to take the casualties.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Translating the following directly: Also in support of the fascists were one detachment (Abteilung = 3 batteries) 10,5cm and three mortar batteries (no calibre, expect 81mm or 120mm) which were situated one to two kilometres south of Leontina.

Can you tell why they were situated so close to the front ? And bunched up like that ?

Translating again: The Soviet attack was supported by three divisional artillery detachments, connected by radio. [...]

Indicating they did have the ability to call in unprepared fire missions quickly on targets of opportunity when needed.

The initial barrage knocked out most of the fire support of the enemy strongpoint as well as the aritllery and mortar batteries south of Leontina.... SNIP..... 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

Would the term "paralyzed" be better than "knock out" when talking about the arty being dealt with ? smile.gif

Still, them being KO'd because they were so tightly bunched up and so close to the front does not surprise me. They may even have been fully functional but got overrun by the Soviet infantry, given the ferocious speed they seem to hav swept over the defensive positions.

The fight must have been vicious, and quite mercyless. At 1800 hours, Leontina was cleaned of the enemy. On the battlefield, 1,200 dead fascist soldiers and officers were left. 30th GAR brought in 250 (sic!) POWs and 37 guns, amongst them seven assault guns, as trophies.

Any data on the Soviet casualties in this engagement ?

[Andreas]

tero, no data on the Soviet casualties unfortunately.

I have been thinking about the positioning of the guns, and it may have been a conscious design decision, to ensure that should the front on the flanks of the strongpoint be ruptured, it would still have artillery to control the breakthrough sectors and to defend themselves. Which may not have been the case had the guns been further back. Leontina was prepared for a perimeter defense.

[Grisha]

tero,

Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed.

PERSONNEL LOSSES

Strength: 1,314,200
Killed or Missing: 13,197
Wounded: 53,933
Total: 67,130

MATERIÉL LOSSES

Tanks and SP Guns: 75
Artillery: 108
Aircraft: 111

Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

[Mike]

Originally posted by tero:
Originally posted by Mike:

We tend to think of Russians as using crude tactics and strategy, whereas they are as clever as anyone else.

What made them so different was their willingness, or better preparedness to take the casualties.I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties - but yes, the high commands have often seemed to see soldiers as a resource to be used.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

tero, no data on the Soviet casualties unfortunately.

Would be nice though to know how they fared in the breakthrough phase.

I have been thinking about the positioning of the guns, and it may have been a conscious design decision, to ensure that should the front on the flanks of the strongpoint be ruptured, it would still have artillery to control the breakthrough sectors and to defend themselves.

Concur. They clearly did not think about the eventuality the breakthrough attack would fall there. The kind of set up they chose was designed to deal with a local (spoling) attack.

Which may not have been the case had the guns been further back. Leontina was prepared for a perimeter defense.

Seems so. "Not a step back" spirit shining through ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed.... Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

Helps out some. Only WTC is unabridged Soviet data through and through so the figures are not as reliable as the ones in Glantz's later works. smile.gif

[Tero]

Originally posted by Mike:

I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties

Well, a dug in Red Army unit with a deglared mission and some leadership was a bitch to uproot because they would not surrender. Seems this is dependant on the sector and time period though.

The spearhead of the attacks really leaned on the barrage.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

Which of them was the one who actually took Berlin ? smile.gif

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:
Originally posted by Mike:

I don't know that the individual soldiers are better prepared to be casualties

Well, a dug in Red Army unit with a deglared mission and some leadership was a bitch to uproot because they would not surrender. Seems this is dependant on the sector and time period though.

The spearhead of the attacks really leaned on the barrage.

Those that thought about it a bit more tended to do better - Suvarov, Brusilov.......

Which of them was the one who actually took Berlin ? smile.gif Konew, but Shukow got all the glory :D Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely.

Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy.

[Grisha]

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely.

Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do smile.gif Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread.

Regarding Konev-Zhukov, Glantz has said that Konev was indeed enraged at Zhukov, but the Berlin demarcation was only the icing on the cake. During operation Mars Glantz felt that Konev may have been made the scapegoat for its failure by/for Zhukov. Also, during the actual approach of Berlin, Konev's forces were taking artillery from Zhukov's forces. Pretty sad too when you realize that it was probably Zhukov who saved Konev's life in 1941.

[Grisha]

tero said:
Helps out some. Only WTC is unabridged Soviet data through and through so the figures are not as reliable as the ones in Glantz's later works. I've posted what Kirosheev has on the Yassy-Kishinev operation at the map site of same [click here (http://www.adamfive.com/guerrero/maskirovka/)]. The data is split up between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts as well as breaking down the the units involved.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory :D

So did they "think about it a bit more" ? Or did they break the eggs as necessary ? smile.gif

Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy.

Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner.

Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?

[TSword]

tero,

You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight.

If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange".

Greets
Daniel

[Tero]

Originally posted by TSword:

tero,

You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight.

If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange".


I just wonder about that "come into sight by surprise" bit.

My knowledge of the practises of the Red Army in situations like this predisposes me to think they might have burrowed down and dug trenches towards the Germans lines and used them to get the edge over the defenders who were under heavy artillery barrage.

Also, was it German SOP to clear fire lanes and vegetation from in front of their positions to facilitate spotting ?

The kind of terrain this fight was fought over would have required some LOS obstruction be left in place to mask the defensive positions.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:
Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do smile.gif Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread.Grisha, he is one of my mates and is over here regularly, to chat about how crap the Wehrmacht was. :D

Seriously though, good job on the loss figures, very low considering what the offensive achieved, and I am reasonably convinced it was not a 1:4 exchange either ;) Still have to find the time to read that leavenworth paper :(

That kife-saving story I am not aware of, can you elaborate?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by tero:
Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner.

Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?tero, finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess.

As long as the snipers fired during the height of the battle, they remained unnoticed. It was not until they continued firing after the noise had died away that they were discovered and brought down by machine-gun fire. The last of them tried vainly to flee. Immediately recognized in the open terrain, they were killed by the fire of the nearest machine gun before they were able to reach the cover of the forest. Snipers in the trees of a forest were no novelty for the troops, but here for the first time they had been found in fruit trees in the open terrain where no one expected them. Though doomed, they had executed their mission. They had carried it out regardless of the fact that their lives were being forfeited. That was the new experience in the surprise attack at Paislinis. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

[JasonC]

On Russian unit strengths, my impression is that at the start of major offensives 2/3rds to 4/5ths of TOE is the right range (~400 per battalion, or 40-50 tanks per "brigade"), while late in a major operation more like 1/3 to 1/5 is the right range (100-200 per battalion, or 10-20 tanks per "brigade"). I am speaking of infantry and tank strengths, compared to unit designations. On the German (and minor axis) side, the usual case is 1/3 to 1/2 of nominal TOE, with only reserve formations at 2/3rds and above.

This is part of the explanation for the force to space figures. The other part is the depth of the attack. The descriptions already given speak of the deployment of the divisions and regiments, but the 2-1 deployment scheme repeats at the lower echelons as well. That is, on the corps frontage 2 divisions are up and 1 is back. 5 out of 6 of the regiments in the up divisions are up, while 1 is back, so with the reserve divison the regiments are 5 up, 4 back.

Then of those 5 regiments, you'd expect 10 battalions to have front line assigned. 20 companies. Each company, at the start of a major offensive, probably around the strength of 2 full platoons, plus some supporting weapons, engineers, etc. Thus 40 full strength platoon equivalents in the first wave. Which puts each one on a frontage of 100m. That is a dense attack certainly, but perfectly believable for the built-up start of a major offensive on the most concentrated sector.

Remember also that this is wooded terrain for the most part. In CM terms, perhaps 2/3rds rural heavy vegetation, with 1/3rd farmland moderate vegetation or so. They say the road network was poor and that there were few villages in the sector. Marshland, water barriers, and deeper forest (which go together because people can't make much use of low lying, wet ground and so leave it forested) would be the main channelers and obstacles.

Then you have to realize how the depth would function. The better performing portions of the first wave would continue on. Places where they got hung up, the next echelon higher would put in an additional wave just as dense as the first, over that portion of the frontage, "shooting the bolt" of that echelon of reserve. There could be such waves at battalion, regiment, division, and corps level if necessary, so a given position might have to fight off 5 such waves in succession.

Picture platoons on 100m each in woods, side by side, with another such wave following about 500m behind (but veering to cover only half the frontage, where the first gets held up), and supporting heavy weapons - mortars, HMGs, light cannon - in between the waves.

The defending axis forces have elements of 4 divisions. But divisions "in name only", meaning step reduced. And in such terrain, that would mean a thin outpost line and main positions half a kilometer to a kilometer back, as local strongpoints from platoon sized up to reduced battalion sized, each with all around defense.

The "Russians appearing" comment and the flamethrowers are due to the terrain. LOS is limited over large portions of it. The Russians are leading with small detachments of FTs and SMGs to overpower listening posts in the woods. The idea being to blind portions of the defense and cut a way in. With the main body of mixed rifle and SMG platoons following behind, meant to deal with strongpoints and MLR positions behind the outposts. Where they hit air, they bypass or help hit a nearby strongpoint from 2-3 sides. Following waves lap around the positions still holding out.

The Germans are using their artillery and heavy weapons (mortars etc) in strongpoints close to the MLR for several reasons. One, they aren't as reduced as front line infantry strength, and their defensive power and manpower are needed to flesh out the defense. Two, the defense is thin enough in that kind of terrain that the Russians are going to get through somewhere regardless, so a linear infantry defense far ahead of the guns is impractical. The guns get infantry defense by being located right with the MLR infantry in its strongpoints. Three, each strongpoint needs the ability to reach out and influence the battles around it, cover the ground between, etc. With the infantry odds so long against them, infantry counterattacks are not a practical way of doing that. Sending one platoon off into the wide woods crawling with Russians is just a death sentence, so they send fire missions instead (exploiting the high Russian target density, etc).

The drawback to that deployment of the guns is that they are closer to the front and thus vunerable to counterbattery fires. The Russian guns would be pretty far forward to reach through the whole German defended zone, since this was a major set piece attack.

The Germans evidently preferred to risk KO by such fires than to risk overrun in the rear by bypassing Russian infantry, probably because they were hoping for poorer Russian infantry-artillery cooperation - and for their positions being unlocated in the forests. Which it seems the Russians did not suffer from as much as the Germans hoped, had IDed enough gun positions beforehand for the initial barrage to seriously mess them up, etc.

The German strongpoint mentioned was obviously a regimental KG strongpoint, based around its attached artillery battalion - 12x105mm - and reserve infantry battalion. Which would have its own battalion mortars. The 37 guns mentioned as captured, and "including 7 assault guns", were probably the artillery battalion's 12 105s, regimental infantry guns (6-8) and mortars (6-12 81mm per battalion), and whatever Pz Jgrs were attached to that KG (sounds like the remaining strength of a StuG or Marder company).

You'd have to imagine the other two battalions in the KG out in front of that strongpoint, and probably somewhat to either side, as the screen. Lower in strength than the reserve strongpoint, and spread over 4-6 positions and a dozen or so listening posts, in two "belts". The idea being for the listening posts to detect incoming attacks and gauge their strength and direction, then fall back to the up-battalion fighting positions. The massed guns in the KG strongpoint then allocate fires to break up the attacks ahead of them in sequence. The assault guns and an alert company back in the reserve position are standing by to counterattack to reestablish the line here or there as needed. That would be the plan.

But the reality of the execution would be, the guns get suppressed by counterbattery, the OP-LPs get overrun. Confused fighting at the forward strongpoints, some holding up the first wave but inundated by the second or third. They don't do any better because the artillery they counted on does not come down in support of them. Large portions of the Russian first wave, passing between the forward positions, reach the reserve KG position around the guns, and lap around it. As their supporting waves come up, they attack, and the defenders have lost too many of their guns already to hold out well. Thus the large bag of guns at that one location, and the German description of mere holdouts here and there by nightfall and basically destroyed.

That is how I would flesh out the higher level narrative and raw recounting of engaged units you so typically get from Russian staff study sources. I hope it is interesting.

[Grisha]

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

What is more they anticipated the German reactions and used that to work in their favour.

[Paul Lakowski]

As I recall , Glantz reports that priority was give to fire support weapons at the expence of line troops or 'trench strenght'. This was a diliberate policy to increase the ratio of Arty, mortars ATGs per soldier as a means of more effectively dealing with german attacks.

If the division staffing was 7000, then full fire support weapons and two platoons per line company max! Even they would be a reduced strenght.

1:50,000 scale maps are available in the UBC map library here in Vancouver [B.C.], so terrain detail is not a problem for those who live in the Seattle area ....come to think of it I have some of these maps photo copied!

In the Book "OStFront", the Pz Divisions are reported to field only ~ 20 tanks and face 100-300 SOviet tanks/SP at a time so 10:1 sounds about right.

[ August 03, 2002, 05:52 AM: Message edited by: Paul Lakowski ]

[Andreas]

Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post.

Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E)

</font> Armour
Panzer III 5 (10)</font> Panzer IV 36 (81)</font> Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font> SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font> SP AT 17 (31)
Artillery</font> Hummel 7 (8)</font> Wespe 16 (16)</font> towed 41 (43)</font> towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font> MG 690 (1,104)

Vehicles</font> Trucks 697 (1,637)</font> small vehicles 240 (677)
</font>A statement in the history of 13. PD is that 'the defensive attributes of the position were good, because higher ground on the western side of the Dnjestr offered good observation into the rear of the enemy'. They did however have serious problems with Malaria and fevers, caused by Mosquitoes in the swamp.

Edited to correct list.

[ August 04, 2002, 03:07 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Andreas:
[QB]Paul, hi. I realised I did not put info about the probable strength of 13. PD up here after I read your post.

Strength return from 1st August 1944 (numbers in brackets are TO&E)

</font> Panzer III 5 (10)</font> Panzer IV 36 (81)</font> Panzer V Panther 0 (79)</font> SPW, AC, FOO Tanks 75 (264)</font> SP AT 17 (31)
Artillery</font> Hummel 7 (8)</font> Wespe 16 (16)</font> towed 41 (43)</font> towed heavy AT 41 (71)</font> MG 69 (1,104)
Vehicles</font> Trucks 697 (1,637)</font> small vehicles 240 (677)
</font>QB]I like these figures they look similar to figures for the 1SS Pz Div in 1943....It seems that the division had anywhere from 180-230 tanks and Assault guns. However at no time during that year where they able to field more than half that number . Often only 70-80 tanks were available for offensive opps and after several weeks this was down to ~ 30-40 operational tanks.

To me, the Germans should have invested more in ARV and repair crews so they could rely on more than 1/4 to 1/2 of there tank force being operational!

[Munter]

Tero,

"auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue. ;)

M

[Tero]

Originally posted by Munter:

"auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue. ;)

IMO you should translate it as "sukeltaa esiin" instead of "ilmestyä". Translated like that the connotation is more evident. smile.gif

From L. Jäntti "Kannaksen suurtaisteluissa kesällä 1944" written in 1955 p 51: major Tirronen, the arty commander of 10D in the IVAK sector where the breakthrough happened June 10th, inspected the positions May 13th and discovered the Soviet troops had started digging assault trenches already in May 11th. These trenches ran all the way up to Finnish obstacles, as near as 70 meters from the defensive positions.

(Ohohoh... reading on it says the Finnish High Command was aware of the Normandy Invasion and the co-ordinaton between the Soviets and the Western Allies already in May. VERY interesting......)

The 10D frontage was 12-15 km's.

The Soviets had 300-400 tubes per kilometer in the sector. They fired 50 000-60 000 rounds in June 9th alone. The barrage on the 10th was even heavier. The Finnish arty had 5 tubes per km and they fired approx. 9 000 rounds that day.

The Soviet fire preparations: up to 1000 aircrafts at and up to 15 km's behind the front lines. Apparently the artillery concentrated on pulverizing the front lines.

The breakthrough made by the XXX GAC (45th GD, 63rd GD, Guards Armoured Brigade, three Guards Armoured Breakthrough Regiments and 64th GD in the second echelon) in the 10th extended up to 15km's behind the front line and was approx. 20 km's wide.

JR1, JR58 and ErP 20 casualties on June 9th-10th were 159 KIA, 619 WIA and 647 MIA (later found to have been killed). 172 men were returned in the POW exchange. JR1, which was took the worst beating, lost all in all 872 men, 396 of them WIA. Of the 350 horses the regiment had they lost approx. 200.

The arty of 10D suffered in those two days 104 casualties, 16 of them KIA. 68 guns were lost to the enemy, most of them abandoned for lack of tractors and horses.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess.

As long as the snipers fired during the height of the battle, they remained unnoticed. It was not until they continued firing after the noise had died away that they were discovered and brought down by machine-gun fire. The last of them tried vainly to flee. Immediately recognized in the open terrain, they were killed by the fire of the nearest machine gun before they were able to reach the cover of the forest. Snipers in the trees of a forest were no novelty for the troops, but here for the first time they had been found in fruit trees in the open terrain where no one expected them. Though doomed, they had executed their mission. They had carried it out regardless of the fact that their lives were being forfeited. That was the new experience in the surprise attack at Paislinis. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002.

That is pretty conclusive.

But the way I read it they snipers were not tied to the trees. They were IN the trees but at least this quote does not clearly indicate they were actually TIED to the trees.

Or if so then the marker in CMBB for running sniper would have to be a running tree... :D

[ August 05, 2002, 05:41 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Andreas]

Time to BUMP this baby, seeing some of the morosity posted in John's Kursk thread...

[Redwolf]

Bump

[PeterNZer]

Late bumpage, interesting thread.

In Band of Brothers book it's interesting that on the attack on the 105s on d-day the soldiers now joke about how gung-ho they were as a couple of them climbed trees to shoot down on the 105 gun defenders, they said that within a few months they couldn't believe how crazy and new-guy-ish they had acted.

[Silvio Manuel]

BUMP
for Shosties4th

[Andreas]

Woohay! Blast from the past. Still my favourite thread! smile.gif

Managed to repair one of the broken links. I'll do the other ones tonight.

[ May 21, 2003, 04:59 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Shosties]

Thanks. I vaugely remember this one from when Andreas started it. It deserves being crossposted over to the CMBB topic area.

Having it stated as susinctly as possible for how this translates into "historically-informed" unit purchasing for CM QBs and scenarios and then fighting them would be nice, ala JasonC's recommendations for the Germans and Americans and JonS' for the Commonwealth in CMBO.

[Andreas]

Bump

[Tank Ace]

And who wants to attack like the damn bolsheviks?

[Andreas]

Thanks for that most intelligent, deep, and well thought-through contribution.

[Tank Ace]

no problem

[Dandelion]

Puzzles me why Admin hasn't moved this thread to the CMBB forum, where it would certainly have the highest of re-use values. At least IMHO.

Are there any equivalent poolings of knowledge on Western Front operations, with a scenario designer perspective, anyone?

Regards
Dandelion

[Shosties]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Are there any equivalent poolings of knowledge on Western Front operations, with a scenario designer perspective, anyone?
Try this (http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=1;t=025262;p=1). Less operational history, but lots of CM level stuff.