Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first

[John Kettler]

This is a terrific, well-reasoned discussion of the views of various historical camps (pro, con and neutral) on Suvorov's counter to the standard accounts claim that Stalin planned to attack Germany, but that Hitler beat him to the punch. I hadn't looked into this since months ago when someone posted a withering blast against Suvorov and his position, but it now appears
archival evidence has emerged not only not disproving his claim, but actively supporting it, featuring some "Russian nobody" named Zhukov and his rather damning set of military recommendations. Recall, this is the guy who handed the Japanese their heads at Khalkin Gol.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov

This will not only make quite a nice read for Eastern Front buffs, global strategists and the like, but would seem to offer all kinds of interesting new CMBB scenario and op possibilities.

While I'm glad ICEBREAKER and THE CHIEF CULPRIT at least got published in English (will need to grab and read both), at the same time I'm frustrated that so much of the rest of the printed debate's in Russian only, which I can't read.

Regards,

John Kettler

P.S.

Am astounded there's actually a picture of this guy in the Wiki, seeing as how he was sentenced to death in absentia in the U.S.S.R., said sentence executable anywhere, any time.

[JasonC]

It is nonsense, it originates in Hitler's claims justifying the attack publically when the invasion was announced. Private correspondance with Mussolini shows this was nonsense and the real reason was strategic, not pre-emptive.

Stalin was completely surprised, they thought they had a deal and that Germany was going to stick to dismembering the British empire while Russia sat it out. That is why they were continuing to deliver their pact raw materials to Germany until literally the night before the invasion, with trains crossing the frontier to give stuff to the Germans after the bombers had already crossed into Russian airspace.

Did the Russian military plan for all possibilities? Of course, that is what military planning staffs do for a living. But the political leadership makes such decisions - recommendations aren't decisions - and the Russian political leadership discounted all the attack talk - quite accurate - as a British plot to separate them from the Germans to drag them into the war, to die for the English capitalists. And Stalin wasn't buying it.

Everything since has been the Russian "it is all Stalin's fault!" version of the "it's all Hitler's fault!" sport the German generals engaged in right after the war - just delayed by communism still being in power. It is revisionist nonsense. Russia was caught flat footed by a calculated outright aggression.

They weren't expecting it for the simplest of reasons - it was an irrational blunder of world-historical proportions, and lost Germany the war. They thought the Germans would be saner and smarter than that, having given them a sweetheart of a deal for a one front war.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Hi John
I think that you need to draw a destinction between Survorov's claim that the USSR planned an aggressive war against Nazi Germany and Zhukov's claim that plans were made for a spoiling attack just before Barbarossa. It was standard Soviet thinking that the best form of defence was attack and that an initial enemy advance would be met by a counter attack that would drive the enemy back onto their soil and that the principal battles would take place on enemy territory. A spoiling attack of this nature in June 1941 was well within the Soviet General Staff's remit. This tactical attack would still fit in with Stalin's strategy of waiting a few years before war with Germany.
cheers

[Stalin's Organist]

If it's supposed to show somethign rational in Suvarov's position it fails miserably.

the quote from Koivisto:

The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive, but for offensive aims.

is quite breathtaking in its simplistic duplicity - the Soviets were still BUILDING defensive positions when the war broke out!

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I know that Hitler had Russia in his crosshairs long before German forces crossed the Bug, being well aware of both the Lebensraum concept and Hitler's views of the racial worth of the Slavs.

Der Alte Fritz,

That is an excellent point, to which I'd reply that Suvorov in his English works published before ICEBREAKER makes it abundantly clear that the Russians had decided the best place to fight a war was on the other guy's turf and had postured themselves accordingly. The country was reeling from the combined effects of WW I, the Revolution, the Russian Civil War, etc., and was in no shape to fight another war on the already shattered home field.
The Soviet political and military doctrine of the period was unabashedly expansionist and envisioned Soviet global domination. That said, the Russian bear ran into all sorts of problems which forced it to curb its predations. Revolutions proved easier to discuss in theory than to implement in reality.

Stalin's Organist,

That may be true, but I've read the defensive wasn't even being taught at the time, which, to me at least, seems significant. This is an issue that was hot right up until the then Soviet Union collapsed, with the CAFE bugaboos being forward deployed tanks, artillery, missiles, deep strike aircraft, MRLs and tactical bridging units and equipment. If you're postured defensively, you don't need all that stuff "in the shop window," as the Brits so beautifully put it.

I think, too, the point Suvorov raises about those huge parachute formations is well taken. Paratroops are offensive weapons par excellence, and any other use is a desperation measure brought about by lack of ability to gain air superiority, inadequate lift, and/or some form of acute military need, as when we raced the 101st Airborne into Bastogne by truck. Make no mistake, Tukhachevsky et al. were advancing an offensive doctrine based on deep strike. That's what all those paratroopers and fancy associated toys were for.

I'm well aware that the Russians were, for example, forbidden by Stalin from attacking Ju-86 recce aircraft overflying Russia days before Barbarossa, that Stalin refused to believe the priceless info Richard Sorge obtained, that the Russians were punctilious (at Stalin's insistence) in continuing the wheat deliveries to Germany right until the shooting started, that mobilization was forbidden by him and that, per his personal telegrapher, he was on the verge of abandoning Moscow as the Panzers closed in and several times put out peace feelers to Hitler, just as I'm aware he was in a deep funk right after the invasion began, as was splendidly depicted by Robert Duvall in HBO's "Stalin." Since you mention the Russians were building defensive positions when the war broke out, please describe location, type, armament, etc. I know the Stalin Line had long been under construction, only to be abandoned when Russia expanded westward, and I see that the Wiki, without saying it explicitly, essentially confirms what I've been telling you: Russian doctrinal rejection of defense in depth was because of an offensive strategy. If you defend in depth, you are by definition not on the offensive and are thus violating doctrine.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin_Line

Here are some surviving Stalin Line (originally built to keep at bay Russia's hereditary enemy, Poland) defenses in the Western Military District, now Belarus.

http://svsm.org/gallery/StalinLine

By contrast, the later Molotov Line was a joke, as detailed in the Wiki. If it had been all that important to Stalin, it would've been much further along.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov_Line

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw.../lines1941.htm

In the case of Lithuania, not one casemate was operational when the war began, not one!

http://ginklai.net/tunelis/fortifica.../index.en.html

To me, a linear defense, backed by a force with thousands of forward deployed aircraft and tanks, as seen by the subsequent shattering by the Germans of the former on the ground and the envelopment of the latter, is a credible defense against a border incursion and that's about it. The Germans stunningly demonstrated its vulnerability as soon as the war began, piercing it at will in all but a few places, such as Brest-Litovsk, already heavily fortified from earlier times.

Will close with what appears (having not read ICEBREAKER yet) to be a precis of Suvorov's key points. Can anyone who's read the book confirm or deny this? If the data are true as given, and are not "cooked" or "spun," then we do indeed appear to have a powerful series of evidences in support of Suvorov's hotly debated claim regarding what Stalin was planning to do and why. Note that the article explicitly backs my thought model regarding defenses for the new Russian border. No one with defense on his mind would do even half the things listed, but someone getting ready to attack would.

"Fourteen Days that Saved the World"

http://stumbleinn.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5588

Just so we're clear, I'm simply presenting an article that turned up on a Google search.
Even so, if the Ivanov quote is correct, it's most revealing. At the time of the following article, at least, Paul Ballard was in serious legal hot water, as evidenced in this long radio interview discussing his and other cases in the much broader context of civil liberties, freedom of expression, and the history of the revisionist movement in history.

http://debatt.sol.no/node/7306161


Regards,

John Kettler

[76mm]

Dear John:

It is no secret that Soviet military doctrine consistently emphasized the offensive, both pre-world war II and thereafter. That doesn't mean that Stalin had any intention to launch a pre-emptive attack against the germans, only that such an attack would have been compatible with their doctrine. as others in this thread have stated, just because the military planned for such an attack doesn't mean that the politicians were about to order it. Isn't that pretty simple?

[Tero]

By JasonC

It is nonsense, it originates in Hitler's claims justifying the attack publically when the invasion was announced. Private correspondance with Mussolini shows this was nonsense and the real reason was strategic, not pre-emptive.

That however goes to Hitlers motives, not Stalins. It is ridiculous to think Stalins motives can be extrapolated from Hitlers private correspondence.

Stalin was completely surprised, they thought they had a deal and that Germany was going to stick to dismembering the British empire while Russia sat it out. That is why they were continuing to deliver their pact raw materials to Germany until literally the night before the invasion, with trains crossing the frontier to give stuff to the Germans after the bombers had already crossed into Russian airspace.

True. However, Stalin did not sever diplomatic relation with the Western Allies even when he made the pact with Germany. He was playing both sides of the table for time knowing that he who joins the war last is on the winning side. I trust he was aware the British and the French did not want USSR on the German side. Stalins plan backfired when Stalin came close to winding up in war with the Western Allies over Finland. The failure of the Red Army during Winter War meant that it became obvious (and painfully so to Stalin) the Red Army was in no shape to fight a mobile war the way Germans had envisioned it.

Did the Russian military plan for all possibilities? Of course, that is what military planning staffs do for a living. But the political leadership makes such decisions - recommendations aren't decisions - and the Russian political leadership discounted all the attack talk - quite accurate - as a British plot to separate them from the Germans to drag them into the war, to die for the English capitalists. And Stalin wasn't buying it.

British plans to separate them from the Germans ? AFAIK they planned an expedition to take the Swedish iron ore mines (er... help Finland) and they planned to bomb the Soviet Far Eastern oil fields.

Russia was caught flat footed by a calculated outright aggression. They weren't expecting it for the simplest of reasons - it was an irrational blunder of world-historical proportions, and lost Germany the war.

Surprised, yes. Flatfooted, no. The attack was no surprise, the timing was. The Red Army were in the middle of post-Winter War reshuffle.

The German decision to attack when they did was not entirely irrational. Foolhardy, extremely ambitious and totally arrogant, yes. Hitler must have realised any delay in his master plan would have meant the Red Army would have been reorganized and re-equipped if he turned East too late. He had seen the Red Army throw away a middle sized countrys army worth of men and materiel over what was essentially a secondary objective. The apparent weaknesses of the Red Army had to be exploited before it could recover and learn from its mistakes.

Stalin must have known his army was at its most vulnerable during the reshuffle. The reason why the Red Army was not deployed in a defensive posture is obvious IMO: Stalin (and STAVKA) knew conventional fixed linear defences did not work against the Germans after what they had seen in Poland and the Western Europe. To them adhering to their standard strategy was the best way to counter the imminent threat. All their available cadre had been trained to fight that way. Having them prepare to fight the way they were trained was their best option. They had the space to trade for time and they had the reserves to sacrifice the troops for the greater good. Hence the plans to cross over to German held territory as per their strategy were surely drawn even if the army was not really up to the task in real world terms.

They weren't expecting it for the simplest of reasons - it was an irrational blunder of world-historical proportions, and lost Germany the war. They thought the Germans would be saner and smarter than that, having given them a sweetheart of a deal for a one front war.

Lets not forget Stalin would have lost little sleep when the decadent West was bleeding itself white fighting amongst themselves. He then would only have to beat the victorious army and the entire depleated West would fall in his lap. The simplest way to conquer the West was to beat the nearest enemy which would have been Germany which would have overpowered the rest of the West with the generous help form the USSR.

[Stalin's Organist]

By contrast, the later Molotov Line was a joke, as detailed in the Wiki. If it had been all that important to Stalin, it would've been much further along.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov_Line

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw.../lines1941.htm

In the case of Lithuania, not one casemate was operational when the war began, not one!

Um...yeah...well that would be because they were still under construction you ..you...you....grr...forum rules prohibit me....

Of course Lithuania is NOT typical - it was only occupied in June of 1940 - 9 months after the eastern areas of Poland. I don't know what hte timeline was for construction of the line, but every other fortified area had at least a couple of dozen bunkers completed by Barbarossa - Lithuania was the only area where there were none.

Of the "line" as a whole (of course it was not a line at all....) there were 575 operational bunkers of about 800 built, with 4900 more still under construction.

which is a considerable investment in defences, and not "a joke" at all.....and you'd have realised that if you'd even bothered to read all the wiki article rather than cherry picking 1 minor point without regard to possible reasons why it might have been the case!!

But hey - don't let the facts get in the way of your carefully constructed and willfully ignorant conspiracy theory....if you did then it would fail on both points after all, and we can't have that!!

[John Kettler]

Stalin's Organist,

I did read the whole article and waded through a great deal of material in addition to that, but my principal point stands. If it had been important to Stalin to complete those casemates and get them operational, then it would've been done. Many casemates were finished in Lithuania, but none was made operational. Not only wasn't building the Molotov Line rushed, but if we're to believe Suvorov's statements, as presented by Ballard, such other defenses as were already in place were systematically removed in order to facilitate offensive operations. This isn't how I'd organize a defense, this isn't how the U.S. commanders of the time defended, nor anyone else, and it isn't even what we saw the Russians do during the German drive on Moscow. In fact, this is the antithesis. Why is that so hard to grasp? If Stalin wanted something done, he issued the orders, and that was that.

From this, it logically follows that had he wanted serious border defenses in place, they would've appeared like toadstools after a spring rain. If there wasn't time for concrete, we would've seen loads of mines, barbed wire, pilings, and field fortifications for troops, MGs, ATRs, ATGs, mortars and artillery. Even horses! I have the field regulations. And did I mention antitank ditches? We don't. Instead, the mines in high traffic areas are lifted, and the barbed wire's cleared away too. What's wrong with this picture? Plenty! If the info's right, Stalin made it look like he was fortifying his new border, while systematically denuding it in those places from which he intended to launch offensive operations, and through which he needed to move large quantities of men, equipment and supplies without impediment.

Lifting of mines and obstacle removal constitute prime intelligence indicators that a force under surveillance is getting ready to go on the offensive, as are the forward deployment of artillery and the placing of large numbers of aircraft on forward airfields. Or did I imagine the Luftwaffe destroyed the Red Air Force wholesale on the ground in the first hours of Barbarossa, with planes lined up in neat rows and not in revetments?

I can tell I've struck a nerve here, but try not to have an aneurysm because the topic's so upsetting and contrary to your beliefs. It is the evidence that concerns us. I suspect we'd learn much from the relevant German unit war diaries, but I don't have them
handy. Still, there's Google!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa

Oh, look! The Wiki not only confirms what I've been trying to tell you, but amplifies it, including the devastating morsel that the maps issued to the forward troops were for....wait for it ....German territory! No maps of Russia were provided. IN INSIDE THE SOVIET ARMY, published way before ICEBREAKER, Suvorov had commented on what a terrible time the German had getting maps of Russia once the invasion began and how this hurt their artillery effectiveness. Hard to capture usable maps when the foe wasn't issued any! Note, too, that some of the most painful blows to your counterargument are delivered by a Russian historian, using Russian archival evidence.

Russian aircraft were massed in huge numbers (what you do in an offensive) on permanent fields and improvised, and the fuel depots were...forward! This is why the Luftwaffe was able to wreak such havoc, so fast. That Russian air assets were forward and exposed is confirmed in this paper.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...t/1995/SVA.htm

Referring to my previous "shop window" argument, a defending force doesn't posture itself that way, and it certainly doesn't put all that effort into building new forward airfields and hiding them. This combination of ground defense removal, forward staging of aircraft and fuel and keeping of huge mechanized forces right at the border zone paints an unmistakable picture of a force gearing up for large scale offensive operations. That, clearly, is what Stalin planned, and that's what's being debated.

I don't care what Hitler did or didn't plan, for that's not the issue. The issue, put legally, was whether Stalin exhibited mens rea regarding his own offensive plans, and his force disposition multiply convicts him. That Hitler got there first with his own carefully honed strike is interesting, but it isn't material. Did it preempt Stalin? Yes! It was also, though, a convenient political "cover" for the long planned Nazi move against Communist Russia and the "inferior peoples" of the east, exactly as described in MEIN KAMPF.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Der Alte Fritz]

Hi John
There is a lot in what you say. But you have to prove that Stalin planned to launch an aggressive war against Germany during the period of the Non-Aggression Treaty.

The position of fortifications being dismantled, troops moving forward, forward airfields, etc is not proof because of the division of Poland. The forces of the USSR had their fixed defences prior to 1939. In 1939 the whole Red Army moved forward and started from scratch on Polish territory. They adopted a mobile, attacking form of defence, maybe even a spoiling attack.

But none of this adds up to aggressive war in 1939-1941 because of the purges, the fiasco in Finland (and in Poland!) and all the personal conversations of Stalin that show he did everything to avoid war before 1943.

Sorry John, I am with David Glantz on this one and he has more archival material on the Red Army than most people.